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Abstract  
This paper explores the consequences of the emerging rivalry between Japanese and 
Chinese manufacturers. It focuses specifically on industrial organisation, one of the 
key factors that underlie the competitiveness of manufacturing industries. The 
question to be asked is what happens when distinctive models of industrial 
organisation, coming from Japan and China, clash in a developing country. An in- 
depth longitudinal analysis of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry adopting a 
modified version of the global value chain governance theory shows that a decade- 
long industrial transformation resulted in organisational diversity. The implications 
of the analysis for the literature on industrial organisation are discussed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, nonpartisan, 
nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute merged with the Japan 
External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  The Institute conducts basic 
and comprehensive studies on economic and related affairs in all developing countries 
and regions, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication 
does not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the 
views expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2013 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of 
the IDE-JETRO. 
 
 
1 
 
The Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation:  
Fighting for Supremacy in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry1 
 
Mai Fujita 
1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, the Japanese manufacturing industry was at the forefront of research on 
economic development and competitiveness. In an attempt to determine the sources of 
Japanese competitive advantage, researchers examined how the distinctive models of 
intra- and inter-firm organisation – characterised by lean production and trust-based 
supplier relations – contributed to the sustainment of superior product development 
and manufacturing performance (Smitka 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1990, 1991; 
Nishiguchi 1994; Dyer 1996; Fujimoto 1999; Lecler 2004). It is now acknowledged 
worldwide that the hierarchical, captive model of inter-firm organisation consisting of 
a powerful lead firm and closely aligned suppliers helped Japanese manufacturing 
firms to achieve superior product development and productivity performance; thus, 
establishing leading positions on major world markets, where consumers valued high 
quality, product differentiation, and fast product innovation.  
The influence of the Japanese model was not restricted to the domestic market. As 
Japanese firms expanded abroad via FDI, the original model was transferred and 
adapted to different country contexts. As Japanese and local firms engaged in rounds 
of organisational competition and adaptation in the host country environment, various 
hybrid forms of industrial organisation emerged, which resulted in increased 
organisational diversity (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and Sako 
1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000; Ernst 2002; Sturgeon 2007). The Japanese model was 
also adopted independently in both developed and developing countries by local 
producers seeking to improve the productivity of their operations (Kaplinsky 1995; 
Posthuma 1995a, 1995b; Harriss 1995; Humphrey et al. 1998). 
Two decades later, the global industrial landscape has changed. As the growth centres 
                                                   
1 This research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) on 
“Assembler- Supplier Relationship and the Growth of Local Component Suppliers in the 
Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry” (Project No. 20510243) of the Japan Society for Scientific 
Research. 
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of the world’s leading manufacturers have shifted to developing countries, Japanese 
manufacturers face major challenges from Chinese firms, which have attained 
overwhelming cost advantages by means of a distinctive form of industrial 
organisation. The existence of a uniquely Chinese model of industrial organisation has 
not been recognised widely. In a separate paper (Fujita 2013a), based on the literature 
and my own analysis, I sought to establish the key features of the Chinese model of 
industrial organisation, which I found to be characterised by intense price-based 
competition between a large number of lead firms and suppliers engaged in 
arm’s-length transactions. Such an organisational model has enabled Chinese firms to 
attain remarkable levels of price-based competitiveness that challenge the Japanese 
industry leaders.   
This paper investigates the new patterns of rivalry emerging out of the rise of the 
Chinese model of industrial organisation. It does so by examining what happens when 
the two models of industrial organisation, coming from Japan and China respectively, 
clash in a third Asian developing country that seeks to establish its competitive 
industry. Which model is more adaptable to local conditions? Is one superior to the 
other? Do they exist side by side? Does competition open up space for a distinctively 
different model of industrial organisation? How do firm responses vary over time? 
These are the questions that this paper seeks to address. 
Indeed, the aforementioned questions are at the forefront of research on economic 
development and competitiveness. There has long been a discussion on the relevance 
of models of industrial organisation for the pace and patterns of economic development. 
This line of research asks: how important have models of industrial organisation been 
in their countries of origin; how relevant are they for other countries; can they be 
transferred; and, if so, what adjustments need to be made? These and similar questions 
were raised by a group of researchers in a special issue of World Development in 
1995.2 The overall conclusion reached was that research on industrial organisation 
needs to extend beyond models to analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation 
(Humphrey 1995).  
However, although the importance of analysing trajectories of organisational change is 
widely recognised, this has rarely been done systematically. One of the major obstacles 
in this regard has been the lack of a conceptual device for systematically explaining the 
                                                   
2 Special issue on ‘Industrial Organization and Manufacturing Competitiveness in Developing 
Countries’, Vol. 23 No.1. 
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complex processes of organisational transformation, which are shaped by a myriad of 
factors – technological, strategic, institutional, and social. Nevertheless, recent 
theoretical development in the field of global value chain (GVC) governance perhaps 
offers a way forward (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The present paper utilises an adapted version of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework of 
GVC governance developed by Fujita (2013a) to describe and explain the short- and 
medium-term dynamics of organisational adaptation arising from the clash of Japanese 
and Chinese models. In so doing, it seeks to highlight the challenges and tensions that 
firms might face in the process of organisational transformation, and how such 
problems could be overcome. 
In examining the clash of the Japanese and Chinese models in a third country context, 
the paper takes the context of Vietnam and examines the case of its motorcycle 
industry. The rationale for focussing on this sector is because the motorcycle industry 
is the one in which a direct clash between the two models is most prominent, and 
Vietnam was the first locality outside China in which they clashed head-on and fought 
for supremacy. It is now well known that the massive imports of low-priced Chinese 
motorcycles into Vietnam in the early 2000s had a huge impact on the Japanese 
industry leaders (Cohen 2002). What is less well known is that there were repeated 
rounds of organisational adaptation triggered by the emergence of Vietnamese 
motorcycle assemblers inheriting the Chinese organisational model. The ensuing 
competitive adaptation of both Japanese and Chinese organisational models generated 
enormous industrial dynamism, eventually leading this latecomer developing country 
to emerge in a decade as one of the world’s major motorcycle producers.3  
This paper examines how the Japanese and Chinese models were transformed through 
competitive adaptation in Vietnam over a period of a decade. Specifically, it addresses 
the following main research question:    
How has the clash between Japanese and Chinese organisational models affected 
the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
                                                   
3 Production of motorcycles in Vietnam began in 1996 (General Statistics Office 1999). In 2006, 
domestic production and sales recorded 2.1 and 2.4 million units, respectively, making the country 
the world’s fourth largest producer of and market for motorcycles after only China, India and 
Indonesia (General Statistics Office 2009; Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 2008).  
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This research question is explored through an examination of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry over the decade following the late 1990s. The focus is on two sets 
of value chains representative of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial 
organisation respectively. Drawing on data collected at different periods from 
interviews and surveys of lead firms and suppliers, this study engages in an in-depth, 
longitudinal analysis of how the two sets of value chains were transformed as the 
respective lead firms competed for supremacy in the Vietnamese market.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature, identifies research gaps, and elaborates questions and corresponding 
hypotheses derived from previous research. Section 3 presents the conceptual 
framework. Section 4 discusses the research methodology and operationalises the key 
concepts. Sections 5 and 6 comprise the empirical core of the paper, presenting 
analyses of the dynamic transformation of the Japanese and Chinese models of 
industrial organisation respectively in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Section 7 
summarises the findings of the paper and discusses its contribution to the literature on 
organisational models and trajectories.  
2. Literature Review 
The purpose of this section is to review the existing literature of direct relevance to the 
research question explored in this paper. This covers three main strands of literature: 
the literature on models and trajectories of industrial organisation in general; the 
literature on Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in particular; and 
the emergent literature on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Based on gaps 
identified in the course of this review, the section concludes by refining the research 
question and presenting resultant hypotheses.  
2.1 Industrial Organisation: From Models to Trajectories 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a flourish of research on industrial organisation. Spurred by 
the varieties of patterns by which industries were organised – from large and vertically 
integrated business corporations to clusters of small, networked firms, or hierarchical 
networks consisting of a dominant lead firm and layers of smaller suppliers, 
researchers looked into the origins of different patterns and their implications for 
economic competitiveness (Chandler 1977; Dore 1983; Smitka 1991; Womack et al. 
1990; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Sako 1992; Nishiguchi 1994; Piore and Sabel 1984; 
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Langlois and Robertson 1995; Sturgeon 2002). Those patterns recognised as 
particularly successful were codified into models of industrial organisation (Humphrey 
1995). 
Research did not stop at codifying established practices into models but went on to 
analyse how such models were applied in practice. While a model essentially defines 
the key elements of successful experiences, “the experiences upon which the model is 
constructed continue to change” (Humphrey 1995: 151). Moreover, when models are 
transferred, the contexts in which they operate often differ markedly from those upon 
which the experiences were based.  
The existing body of research has looked into how models evolved over time in the 
country of origin in response to changes in external economic conditions, technological 
change, or competitive pressure (Lecler 1999, 2004; Lamming 2000; McCormick 
2004; Sturgeon 2007), and how models transferred to different contexts have gone 
through processes of hybridisation, adaptation, or localisation (Cusumano and Takeishi 
1991; Helper and Sako 1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000). Very often the result was 
“neither a copy of the original model nor a replica of existing local patterns, but 
something different” (Westney 1999: 387). The varieties of country and industry 
experiences analysed in the literature clearly demonstrate the importance of going 
beyond models to analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation (Humphrey 1995). 
However, although the importance of analysing trajectories is widely acknowledged, 
this has rarely been done systematically.  
First, few previous studies have illuminated the actual processes by which 
organisations change. What they have done is either to compare the status of an 
organisation at a given point in time in a given setting – often after successful 
transformation has been completed – with the defining features of the original model; 
or to compare prevailing practices among different groups of companies, for example, 
firms of different nationalities located in a certain country or firms of the same 
nationality but located in different countries (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 
1992; Helper and Sako 1995).  
As a result, the actual processes of organisational diffusion and adaptation, which is 
where insights relevant for firms and policy makers originate (Humphery 1995), 
remain largely underexplored. With what timing and in what sequence do key features 
of the model change? What tensions and challenges do organisations face in the 
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process, and how do they overcome them? Very little of the existing literature 
examines these issues.  
Second, there have been limited attempts to systematically explain why organisations 
evolve in the way they do. On the basis of the existing literature, there seems to be a 
broad consensus that the driver of organisational change typically comes from a lack of 
fit between the elements of organisation and the environment (Westney 1999). The 
problem with such a line of argument is that there has been no incisive debate on what 
precisely is meant by the ‘environment’.  
Existing empirical research mainly refers to the following three dimensions of the 
environment: (1) local market conditions, for example, producer competition and 
consumer preferences (Helper 1991; Lecler 1999, 2004; Humphery 2000; Sturgeon and 
Van Biesebroeck 2010); (2) competence levels and the existence or absence of a local 
component supply base (Sadler 1994); and (3) institutional factors such as legal and 
regulatory environments, capital markets, employment systems, culture, and social and 
moral norms (Dore 1983; Sako 1992).  
However, given the lack of a systematic attempt to deconstruct the concept of the 
environment into a series of concrete, operational variables, we still do not know 
which factors are most important, how they interact with each other, or how they shape 
the processes of organisational change. Unless these questions are tackled, research can 
hardly be expected to pin down the fundamental factors that trigger (or impede) the 
transformation of industrial organisation. Thus, the mechanisms by which variables 
interact in shaping the processes of organisational transformation remain 
underexplored.   
The above two research gaps seem to stem at least in part from the lack of an 
appropriate theoretical framework for categorising the various forms of inter-firm 
organisation or explaining the circumstances under which they emerge in terms of a 
series of concrete, operational variables. Recent theoretical development in the field of 
GVC governance has made important contributions in this regard. This paper adopts 
the revised version of the GVC governance framework for conducting systematic 
analysis of trajectories of organisational change.  
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2.2 Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation in the Motorcycle 
Industry 
In studying industrial organisation, particularly illuminating are the industries in which 
contrasting models of industrial organisation coexist because interactions between 
different models often create new dynamics of organisational transformation.4 With the 
long dominance of the Japanese model and the rise of a new organisational model 
emerging from China, the motorcycle manufacturing sector became an example of 
such industries (Fujita 2013a). 
The Japanese model of industrial organisation was developed out of the need to 
effectively achieve incremental product and process improvements in a proprietary 
product. Since motorcycles had an integral product architecture, lead firms took the 
lead in fine-tuning component designs and providing a quality guarantee to their 
consumers for the product system as a whole (Otahara 2009a, 2009b). Accordingly, 
they adopted a combination of centralised control and generous assistance in governing 
long-term relations with a fixed group of suppliers, which were expected to endeavour 
to achieve performance targets set by the lead firms, often by ceding autonomy (Fujita 
2013a).  
As Japanese manufacturers started to set up overseas production bases from the 1960s 
onwards, the organisational model established in Japan was replicated abroad. Lead 
firms sought to develop long-term relations with local suppliers. Where the local 
component supply base was lacking, this entailed provision of technical assistance to 
the suppliers.5  
Compared to the long-established prominence of the Japanese model, the rise of its 
Chinese counterpart is a recent phenomenon. This model emerged in the early 1990s, 
driven by a large number of indigenous motorcycle manufacturers producing 
low-priced imitations of Japanese models. Contingent on de facto standardisation of a 
few dozen popular Japanese models, large numbers of assemblers and suppliers, both 
of whom were equipped with limited levels of technological competence, engaged in 
arm’s-length transactions. With its strength lying in low costs and flexibility, the 
                                                   
4 This seems to explain why the car industry, in which contrasting models of industrial organisation 
have emerged in the US and Japan, has been studied so widely.  
5 This occurred not only in developing countries such as Thailand (Higashi 2006) and Indonesia 
(Thee 1997; Sato 2011) but also in developed countries such as Italy (Horiuchi 1998). 
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arm’s-length organisational model enabled Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to 
capture the lion’s share of the huge yet volatile domestic market where consumers put 
priority on low prices and intellectual property rights are only weakly protected.  
The above summary of the existing literature suggests that we now know that the 
Japanese model of industrial organisation rose to prominence in the 1980s, and that it 
was transferred to both developed and developing countries – with manufacturers taking 
the lead in nurturing the pool of competent component suppliers demanded by this 
model. We also know that a second discrete model emerged in China. However, we 
know less about what is emerging out of the rivalry between the two models. Which 
model is superior? Which is more adaptable to third-country conditions; especially in 
the developing world, where the bulk of global motorcycle sales are concentrated 
(Fujita 2007)?  
Such an overarching enquiry can be deconstructed into a series of more specific 
questions. In terms of the Japanese model, the key question is whether it can meet the 
Chinese challenge. Whilst the Japanese model has exhibited extraordinary strength in 
catering to sophisticated customers in the developed world, can it be adapted to compete 
with the Chinese model in developing country markets? With regard to the Chinese 
model, there has thus far been no attempt to study whether it can be successfully 
transferred. What changes are required if it is to work in different contexts? This paper 
attempts to answer these questions.   
2.3 The Dynamics of Organisational Adaptation: The Vietnamese Motorcycle 
Industry 
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry provides an excellent case through which to 
address the research gaps identified above. Vietnam was the first locality – after China 
itself – in which the Japanese and Chinese models clashed head-on. Because Vietnam 
is a new context for both models, neither has an advantage over the other; both must 
adapt to local Vietnamese conditions and fight for supremacy in this emerging market.  
On the basis of the existing research on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry (Fujita 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012; Intarakumnerd and Fujita 2008, 2009; Pham 
Truong Hoang and Shusa 2006; Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep 2006, 
2007; The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007), its development was process can be 
broadly divided into three stages.  
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In Stage I (mid-1990s to the end of the decade), three Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers were the key players. Following the Vietnamese government’s decision 
to launch an import substitution policy to promote the domestic production of 
motorcycles, Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Taiwan’s Sanyang established local factories 
(Fujita 2006). As their sophisticated products were priced substantially higher than 
what ordinary Vietnamese consumers could afford, motorcycle sales as a whole 
stagnated, but Japanese–brand motorcycles still accounted for the bulk of the market 
(Figure 1). This small, protected market hardly attracted any scholarly attention at this 
stage. 
It was during Stage II (2000–2004) that the Vietnamese motorcycle industry attracted 
wide interest from businesses, researchers, and policymakers in Vietnam and abroad. 
In the early 2000s, massive volumes of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand 
motorcycles were imported from China – a phenomenon often dubbed the ‘China 
shock’ (Fujita 2007). Since the Vietnamese government had prohibited the import of 
assembled vehicles, Chinese imports arrived in the form of knockdown component kits 
that were assembled by more than 50 local firms (hereafter referred to as ‘local 
assemblers’). With prices as low as a third to a quarter of foreign-brand models, these 
imitations quickly penetrated the medium- and low-income consumer markets that had 
hitherto been unexploited by Japanese firms. The market expanded four-fold in the late 
1990s, and local assemblers of Chinese motorcycles commanded roughly 80% of these 
extended sales (Figure 1).  
The China shock provoked a series of reactions from incumbent producers and 
policymakers. As Vietnam became a symbol of an expanded Chinese threat that had 
already become apparent in China, Japanese companies initiated company-wide efforts 
to regain market shares. This culminated in the launching of a new, low-priced model 
by Honda Vietnam (HVN) in 2002. The new model, named Wave Alpha and priced at 
approximately one-third of its previous models, quickly gained popularity as the 
low-quality of Chinese motorcycles had by now become apparent to Vietnamese 
consumers (The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007).  
The Vietnamese government responded by enacting a series of policy changes to 
restore order and promote the sound development of the industry. However, the 
uncoordinated, sudden, and often arbitrary ways in which policy changes were enacted 
– frequently running contrary to previously announced plans and/or discriminating 
against foreign motorcycle manufacturers (Fujita 2011) – created serious side effects.  
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Figure 1. Motorcycle Sales in Vietnam by Manufacturers 
 
Notes:  
(1) VMEP (Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co., Ltd.) is a 100% invested 
subsidiary of Taiwan’s Sanyang Motors, and Lifan Vietnam is a joint venture between China’s 
Lifan Group and a Vietnamese SOE.  
(2) Data on “Honda (Imported)” was available from the Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007) up 
to 2005 but the figures were zero from 2002 onwards. Data on “Imports” was provided by 
General Statistics Office (various years). 
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the Motobike Joint Working Group (2007), 
Industrial Research Institute (2011) and General Statistical Office (various years).  
First, restrictions on the importation and registration of motorcycles were introduced. 
In September 2002, the Vietnamese government suddenly announced that imports of 
motorcycle components for the year should be limited to 1.5 million units (Cohen 
2002). This was followed by restrictions on motorcycle registration6 and limits on 
investments in expansion of production capacity by foreign motorcycle manufacturers7 
from 2003. Whilst these measures were intended to prevent the uncontrolled 
proliferation of motorcycles on Vietnam’s streets, the consequence was stagnation of 
the overall market growth, with annual sales of motorcycles declining from over 2 
million in 2002 to less than 1.5 million in 2003–4 (Figure 1).  
                                                   
6 Circular 02/2003/TT-BCA by the Ministry of Public Security dated 13 January 2003 limited 
motorcycle registration to one vehicle per person. Decision 98/2003/QD-UB by the Hanoi People’s 
Committee dated 14 August 2003 prohibited new motorcycle registration in four central districts of 
Hanoi.  
7 Prime Minister’s Decision 147/2002/QD-TTg dated 25 October 2002. 
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Second, in an attempt to encourage the development of local assemblers into fully 
fledged motorcycle manufacturers, the government stepped up the enforcement of 
local content rules, which hitherto had been circumvented by local assemblers,8 and 
instituted standards for motorcycle manufacturers, with the requirement that a 
minimum of 20% of local content had to be achieved by in-house manufacturing of 
key components.9 
Notably, some of the aforementioned policies were implemented in ways that explicitly 
favoured local assemblers. When the government suddenly introduced quantitative 
restrictions on component imports in September 2002, local assemblers received 
favourable allocation of import quotas, whilst insufficient quota allocation to HVN and 
Yamaha Vietnam (YVN) even drove these companies to temporarily suspend their 
production.10 From 2003 onwards, as noted above, the government restricted foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers from investing in the expansion of production capacity 
beyond the original proposals granted by the Vietnamese authorities upon the issue of 
FDI licences. This turned out to be damaging to foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
because the rapid expansion of the market in the 2000s had not been envisaged in the 
1990s. HVN, in particular, suffered because this policy hampered the company’s 
ambitions to use the Wave Alpha to regain lost market shares.  
A new phase of industrial development (Stage III; 2005–2008) began as the end of the 
policy turbulence brought about rapid, FDI-driven growth. Diminishing academic 
interest in the industry notwithstanding, this was in fact the time in which the most 
dynamic development occurred (Fujita 2011). In 2005, the Vietnamese government 
abandoned restrictions on motorcycle registration11 together with the policy that had 
prevented foreign motorcycle manufacturers from investing in additional production 
capacity.12 As a result, domestic motorcycle sales climbed to 2.8 million units in 2007, 
far exceeding figures during the China shock (Figure 1).  
                                                   
8 The local content rules were originally announced at the end of 1998 for implementation from the 
beginning of 1999 (Decision of the Ministry of Finance 1994/1998/QD-TTg dated 25 December 
1998). Its full implementation was delayed until the beginning of 2001 due to opposition from local 
assemblers (Ishida 2001).   
9 Prime Minister’s Decision No.38/2002/QD-TTg dated 14 March 2002. 
10 Of the total of 1.5 million motorcycle component imports permitted for the whole year, local 
assemblers were allocated 900,000 units whilst foreign motorcycle manufacturers only received 
600,000 (Cohen 2002).  
11 Circular No. 17/2005/TT-BCA of the Ministry of Public Security dated 21 November 2005 
rescinded legislation limiting motorcycle registration to one vehicle per person and only in the 
locality for which each held household registration. 
12 Official document No. 1854/VPCP-HTQT issued by the Government Office on 11 April 2005. 
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Japanese firms chose to satisfy the growing market in Vietnam via FDI for local 
production, following their conventional approach to the localisation of production in 
countries with large demands for their products.13 Accordingly, they actively invested 
in expansion of production capacity, capturing an increasing share of this fast-growing 
market. In the meantime, local assemblers lost their market share but still held roughly 
one-third of the sales as of 2006 (Figure 1); surviving by catering to low-income 
consumers in the rural areas where Japanese-brand models had still not penetrated. 
Of the three stages of development, the existing literature on industrial organisation 
focuses almost exclusively on Stage II, the period immediately following the China 
shock. Previous studies have emphasised the major changes that both HVN and local 
assemblers implemented to their sourcing practices immediately after the initial clash. 
Pham Truong Hoang (2007), Mishima (2007), and Otahara (2009a) all argue that HVN 
responded to the China shock by significantly diversifying its component sources to 
include non-Japanese suppliers in Vietnam and even local suppliers in China. Pham 
Truong Hoang (2007) also analyses the manner in which local assemblers responded to 
policies requiring local sourcing and investment in in-house manufacturing of 
components. On the basis of case studies of four assemblers, he argues that they shifted 
away from arm’s-length supply systems towards those based on long-term, trust-based 
relations with suppliers.14 
Nevertheless, the above discussion on the stages of Vietnamese motorcycle industrial 
development suggests that analysing the short-term impact of the China shock may not 
be sufficient for an understanding of the dynamics of the competitive adaptation of the 
two models. First, the existing literature acknowledges that the reactions of HVN and 
local Vietnamese assemblers were devised as emergency measures to cope with the 
immediate competitive threat (to HVN) and policy requirements (for local assemblers). 
It remains to be seen whether these adaptations prove to be sustainable in the longer 
term.  
                                                   
13 From its early years, “to explore the world market, to produce where the demand is” has been at 
the core of Honda’s mission (http://www.honda.co.jp/50years-history/009.html, accessed 2 October 
2011). 
14 The four case studies nevertheless indicate varieties of ways in which local assemblers 
responded to market and policy challenges: maintaining arm’s-length linkages, vertically 
integrating component manufacturing, and spurring cooperative relationships with suppliers (Pham 
Truong Hoang 2007). However, the author does not discuss which of these patterns is dominant, a 
shortcoming that is probably due to a failure to provide the reasons as to why the four assemblers 
were selected in the first place. In any case, this research did not include the two assemblers that the 
present study refers to as A1 and A3 – firms it found to be increasingly dominant in Stage III.  
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Second, the period immediately following the China shock was one of policy 
turbulence. Such a distorted and arbitrary legislative environment hardly enabled firms 
to implement long-term, sustainable adaptations to their sourcing practices. Given that 
the period of turmoil was immediately followed by a more stable phase (Stage III), it is 
essential that an analysis of industrial organisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry should be extended to cover this period. However, no previous studies have 
done this.  
The temporal aspect of observation also raises the question of what factors cause 
industrial organisation to evolve. Virtually all of the previous studies cited above 
assume, explicitly or implicitly, organisational patterns are determined by that lead 
firms depending on the characteristics of the products they produce – whether design 
architecture, prices, or quality levels. Accordingly, their focus has been exclusively on 
the lead firms, whilst suppliers – the other key actor in the value chains – have been 
left out of the analyses.  
In Japanese chains, it was the need for radical cost reduction that compelled HVN’s 
adjustment to sourcing practices (Mishima 2007; Otahara 2009a). In respect of local 
assemblers, the need to raise product quality and policy requirements eventually led 
some assemblers to invest in in-house production of components and/or to adopt 
long-term, trust-based relations with their suppliers (Pham Truong Hoang 2007). 
Owing to its almost exclusive focus on product characteristics, research has hitherto 
overlooked the very essence of industrial organisation, that is, power relations between 
firms, which in turn are determined by the nature and levels of capabilities possessed 
by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 
2008). A lead firm has the capacity to enforce particular types and levels of 
requirement on suppliers. However, such capacity has its limits because some suppliers 
may acquire power as they accumulate new competencies that are difficult to replace 
or explore new customers (Schmitz 2004; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
of lead firms and suppliers are central to research on the dynamics of industrial 
organisation but no previous studies have analysed them.  
2.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In view of the research gaps identified above, this paper will examine the evolutionary 
dynamics of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in the 
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Vietnamese motorcycle industry. It addresses the following overarching research 
question: 
How has the competition between Japanese and Chinese organisational models 
affected the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
For the purpose of analysis, this question is divided into two sub-questions.  
Sub-question 1: How did the Japanese and Chinese organisational models evolve in 
Vietnam? 
The literature suggests that the two models converged within a few years of their direct 
clash, as Japanese motorcycle manufacturers expanded their component sources to 
include non-conventional sources for the purpose of spurring competition between 
suppliers, and local assemblers developed long-term, trust-based relations with their 
suppliers. 
Hypothesis: The two models converged within a few years of their initial clash in 
Vietnam. 
The second sub-question is concerned with explaining the organisational 
transformation that eventually occurred.  
Sub-question 2: What factors drove the organisational transformation of the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry?  
Existing empirical research emphasises that the nature of the products, which the lead 
firms adjust in order to cope with competitive pressure, is the key variable in 
explaining the dynamics of an organisational model. 
Hypothesis: Organisational transformation is explained primarily by product 
characteristics determined by the lead firm.  
3. Conceptual Framework and Operationalisation of Key Concepts 
This section develops a theoretical framework for describing and explaining different 
forms of industrial organisation, which is based on a revised version of Gereffi et al.’s 
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(2005) theory of global value chain (GVC) governance developed by Fujita (2013a). 
The section begins by introducing the concept of value chain governance, followed by 
a consideration of five dominant governance types. It then discusses the two key 
variables that determine value chain governance and presents a revised framework that 
uses these two variables to explain the emergence of the five aforementioned types of 
value chain governance. The section concludes with operationalisation of the key 
concepts.  
3.1 Industrial Organisation: Meaning and Type 
An industry comprises (groups of) firms engaged in one or more value-adding function 
that is required to bring products to market – typically referred to as a value chain 
(Sturgeon 2001). The literature on industrial organisation has evolved around the broad 
question of how the upstream to downstream functions surrounding a product are 
aligned to different (groups of) firms, and how relations between these firms are 
coordinated. Starting with the literature on large integrated corporations (Chandler 
1977) and transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979), through to theories on 
network forms of organisation (Powell 1990) and the GVC approach (Gereffi et al. 
2001; Schmitz 2004; Gereffi et al. 2005; Sturgeon 2008), the resultant large body of 
work has demonstrated the range of market and non-market mechanisms through 
which inter-firm relations are coordinated. These mechanisms – referred to by the 
GVC approach as types of value chain governance – are important because they 
influence competitive performance of industries and development prospects for local 
firms participating in value chains (Sturgeon 2002; Schmitz 2004).    
While there are myriad patterns of value chain governance, Gereffi et al. (2005) 
classified value chain governance into five dominant types, which were mapped onto a 
spectrum running from low to high levels of explicit coordination (Figure 2). At one 
end of the spectrum is the arm’s-length market in which transactions are mediated by 
market forces. At the other end of the spectrum there is a hierarchy in which 
coordination takes the form of an internal command structure within a vertically 
integrated corporation. In between these two extremes, there are intermediate or 
network forms of organisation that are neither based on markets nor a hierarchy 
(Powell 1990; Jones et al. 1997). In ascending order of explicit transactional 
governance, these are: 
 Modular chains, in which product standardisation reduces the frequency and 
 
 
16 
 
intensity of interaction, as well as the level of mutual dependence between a lead 
firm and its suppliers   
 Relational chains, which are characterised by complex and intense interaction 
between mutually dependent parties  
 Captive chains, in which a powerful lead firm makes extensive intervention and 
exercises control over smaller and dependent suppliers 
Figure 2. Types of Value Chain Governance 
Degree of Explicit 
Coordination Type Description 
Low 
 
Market Arm’s-length transactions mediated by market forces 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Modular 
Product standardisation enables firms to exchange 
complex information without intense interaction or 
mutual dependence 
 
Types Relational Intense two-way interaction and mutual dependence 
  
Captive Lead firms make extensive intervention and exercise control over dependent suppliers 
High 
 
Hierarchy Vertically-integrated organisation 
Source: The author, based on Gereffi et al. (2005). 
3.2 Determinants of Value Chain Governance  
Why do different forms of governance such as those discussed above exist? And under 
what circumstances do particular governance forms emerge? The strength of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) formulation of GVC governance theory is that it provides a systematic 
device for answering these questions. Specifically, they seek to explain the dynamics 
of value chain governance in terms of three variables: (1) the complexity of 
information exchanged in a transaction; (2) the degree to which such information can 
be codified; and (3) the supplier’s capability level relative to the requirements of a 
transaction.   
This study follows the overall structure of this framework, but makes the following 
adaptations. First, for the sake of simplicity, the first two variables are grouped into 
one broader category: the nature of product and process parameters exchanged in 
transactions.  
Second, whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) concentrate on the codifiability of parameters, 
this study focuses on the degree to which these parameters are standardised, a related 
yet distinct concept. This is because degrees of product and process standardisation 
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constitute one of the essential factors that differentiate the Japanese and Chinese 
models of industrial organisation in the motorcycle industry.15  
Third, the present study’s framework incorporates lead firm capability in addition to 
supplier capability. Because the primary focus of Gereffi et al. (2005) is on the global 
value chains that are coordinated by major transnational corporations (TNCs), they 
implicitly assume that lead firms possess the sophisticated capability necessary to 
coordinate value chains. On the contrary, the present study does not take lead firm 
capability as a given in view of the fact that it addresses the organisational model 
emerging in a developing country context. Rather, it acknowledges that a lead firm 
may be constrained by a shortage of capability in its attempt to establish certain types 
of chain governance.  
Fourth, rather than narrowly focussing on relative levels of capability, that is, whether 
or not supplier capability meets the level required by lead firms, the present study 
highlights the various types of capability that different governance mechanism models 
impose on both lead firms and suppliers.  
The basic structure of this adapted framework is shown in Figure 3, in which value 
chain governance is determined by two variables: the nature of product and process 
parameters communicated in transactions; and the alignment of relevant capabilities 
within the industry. The following subsections examine the two variables individually.   
Figure 3. Value Chain Governance: An Explanatory Framework 
 
Source: The author, adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005) and Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
                                                   
15 This adaptation becomes critical in formulating the conditions under which captive chains 
emerge. Whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) focus on the codifiability of parameters in the form of lead 
firm instructions, the non-standard nature of product and process parameters turned out to be 
critical in explaining why Japanese motorcycle manufacturers had instituted explicit governance 
mechanisms in coordinating transactions with their suppliers.  
The nature of 
product/process 
parameters
The aligment of 
relevant capabilities  
within the industry
Value chain 
governance
Technological shift,  
changes in consumer 
demand, etc.
Acquisition of new 
capabilities by 
incumbents; entry of 
new firms
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3.2.1 The Nature of Product and Process Parameters 
The nature of product and process parameters determines the need for transactional 
governance. It is not the case that every transaction requires explicit coordination; the 
extent to which transactional governance is required depends primarily on the type of 
product being traded (in this case, motorcycle components). The specific focus will be 
on levels of complexity and degree of standardisation, both of which are influenced by 
factors such as technological innovation and changes in consumer demand.  
In respect of simple products, which also tend to be standardised, there is limited need 
for instituting explicit transactional governance: if components are simple and 
standardised, product/process parameters can be specified and communicated with ease. 
Supplier performance is easily observable in the form of delivered outputs and thus 
detailed monitoring mechanisms are not required. Moreover, as standard products do 
not require transaction-specific investment, there is no need to implement safeguards 
against the risks of opportunism (Williamson 1979). Standard products can also be 
produced by a range of suppliers, sold to a variety of lead firms, or produced for stock 
and supplied as necessary (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The need for coordination increases as products become complex and differentiated, 
that is, as they start to take on new demands beyond price level (Schmitz 2006; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2008). Examples include differentiated components that are 
more difficult to design and/or manufacture; higher quality levels; tighter delivery 
requirements in terms of either frequency or punctuality; and additional functional 
requirements (e.g. suppliers take on design responsibilities in addition to 
manufacturing). Implementing new requirements such as these often constitutes an 
additional burden with regard to the communication of product and/or process 
parameters between the lead firm and its suppliers. It also necessitates additional 
mechanisms to ensure that parameters are adhered to, for example, detailed monitoring 
(Schmitz 2006). 
The need for explicit governance also depends on the extent to which parameters are 
standardised. On the one hand, non-standard parameters require explicit coordination 
because they incur additional coordination costs and transaction-specific investment in 
physical and/or human resources (Williamson 1979). This is particularly the case for 
products with integral design architecture. Because such products are characterised by 
complex mapping from functional elements to physical components and tightly 
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coupled interfaces among interacting physical components, they call for fine-tuning 
between the whole product and its component parts if overall product performance is 
to be maximised (Ulrich 1995; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Designing these products 
requires the coordination of detailed design tasks (Ulrich 1995), and their manufacture 
necessitates transaction-specific investment, both of which call for explicit governance 
mechanisms to be in place.  
On the other hand, even when the product is complex, industry-wide product and/or 
process standards may reduce the need for explicit governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). In 
industries that produce products with modular architecture, standards make it possible 
to communicate product and/or process parameters without intense interaction, which 
releases firms from being locked into particular trading relationships (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992, 1995).  
3.2.2 The Alignment of Relevant Capabilities  
The need for transactional governance, however, does not mean that such mechanisms 
can necessarily be implemented in practice. This is where the second variable of the 
alignment of relevant capabilities within the industry comes into play. Governance 
means that a given firm enforces parameters over other firms, a dynamic that demands 
the ability to wield power (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
between a lead firm and its suppliers, in turn, are determined primarily by the types 
and levels of capability enjoyed by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Schmitz 
2006; Palpacuer 2000). 
A lead firm’s capacity to impose parameters on its suppliers usually stems from their 
core competencies in strategic value chain functions (Palpacuer 2000; Schmitz 2006). 
In capital-intensive sectors such as the automotive industry, such strategic functions 
typically include product development, marketing, and manufacturing of core 
components. These functions often constitute the key sources of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the lead firm because they require knowledge- and experienced-based 
assets that are difficult for others to imitate, and because they provide economies of 
scale for the firms that control these functions (Palpacuer 2000: 378).  
A lead firm’s control over strategic value chain functions matters because it tends to 
create two types of dependence on the part of the suppliers. First, lead firm control 
over strategic functions leaves suppliers with non-core functions (Palpacuer 2000), 
 
 
20 
 
rendering them functionally dependent on the lead firm in marketing their products. 
Second, because dominance in respect of product, marketing, and/or branding often 
enables lead firms to gain a high degree of control over the market (Gereffi 1999; 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2000), they often overwhelm suppliers with huge purchasing 
power (Sturgeon 2008), rendering them financially dependent.  
The size of orders takes on particular importance in industries in which product and 
process parameters are non-standard. Because non-standard products often impose the 
additional cost of product-specific investment in physical and human resources, a lead 
firm will face difficulty enforcing non-standard parameters on its suppliers unless 
orders are large enough to make production economically viable.16   
However, it is necessary to analyse lead firm competency in relative terms. Because 
power is relational, suppliers may also acquire it by building core competencies, that is, 
technical or service capabilities that are difficult to replace and become indispensable 
to the lead firm (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000). Suppliers can also 
gain the generic capability to assume responsibility for a bundle of functions, such as 
product design, process development, purchasing, and production, which enables them 
to serve a diverse pool of customers and switch customers if necessary (Sturgeon 2008). 
In contrast, where suppliers only possess capabilities that are easily substituted and/or 
are embedded in relations with specific customers, the lead firm retains the capacity to 
choose and replace suppliers, thus keeping supplier power under control (ibid.).  
3.3 The Revised Framework 
Table 1 shows how the five governance types mentioned in Section 2.1 can be 
explained in terms of different combinations of the two variables outlined in the 
previous subsection. When product and process parameters are simple and standardised, 
market-based chains emerge. This type of chain makes limited capability demand of 
lead firm and suppliers alike, the minimum requirements being that they possess 
routine assembly capability and routine component manufacturing capability 
respectively. 
When industry-wide standards of compatibility enable complex parameters to be 
                                                   
16 Sturgeon et al. (2008) corroborate this point in arguing that the concentrated structure of the car 
manufacturing industry helps each firm to impose its own idiosyncratic standards on suppliers.  
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exchanged without explicit coordination, modular chains emerge whereby suppliers 
acquire generic manufacturing capacity and related service capabilities that enable 
them to serve multiple lead firms simultaneously. On the other hand, while the 
minimum requirement of the lead firm is routine assembly capability using mutually 
compatible components sourced from suppliers, modular chains enable it to focus on 
creation, penetration and defence of markets for its end products (Sturgeon 2002).  
As product and process parameters become complex and non-standard, three types of 
chain governance may emerge depending on the alignment of relevant capabilities. The 
first case is one in which the lead firm and its suppliers are equipped with 
complementary competencies that cannot easily be sourced elsewhere. Such a situation 
gives rise to a relational chain whereby the lead firm and its suppliers are engaged in 
intense two-way interaction; the two parties are mutually dependent and the power 
relation is symmetrical (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
Table 1. Types of Chain Governance and their Determinants 
  
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Lead Firm Capability Supplier Capability 
Market Simple 
No specific requirements beyond routine manufacturing/assembly 
capabilities 
Modular 
Complex/  
Standard 
A minimum of routine assembly 
capability suffices. 
Lead firms usually focus on 
creation, penetration and 
maintenance of markets for end 
products. 
Generic manufacturing and 
related service capabilities. 
Relational 
Complex/ 
Non-standard 
Lead firms and suppliers possess complementary competencies that 
are hard to substitute. 
Captive 
Capacity to exercise dominance 
over suppliers, which usually 
stems from control over 
strategic chain functions. 
A minimum of the basic ability to 
engage in a narrow range of 
simple tasks is required. Suppliers 
develop capabilities in accordance 
with the lead firm’s interventions. 
Hierarchical 
Capability to conduct the 
value-adding functions in 
question. 
Supplier capability is withheld. 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005), Sturgeon (2002), Langlois and Robertson (1995), 
Sturgeon et al. (2008), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), and Palpacuer (2000). 
The second case is characterised by substantial asymmetry in capability levels between 
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a large, competent lead firm and smaller, less competent suppliers. Competence and 
power asymmetry lead to a captive chain whereby the lead firm engages in extensive 
intervention, such as active monitoring and technical assistance; while suppliers 
develop their capabilities – typically, in a narrow range of tasks – under the lead firm’s 
guidance (Schmitz 2004, 2006).  
The last case is one in which limited available external capability makes outsourcing 
unfeasible, meaning that the lead firm is compelled to conduct the required function(s) 
in-house, that is, to create a hierarchy. A hierarchy may also result from cases of 
substantial asymmetry in competence levels (i.e. the second case discussed above) but 
where the lead firm is either unwilling or unable to engage in extensive intervention.  
3.4 Operationalisation of Key Concepts 
For the purpose of empirical analysis, indicators have been developed for the key 
concepts (Table 2). Given the lack of quantifiable indicators for key variables, the 
analysis of trajectories focuses primarily on the direction of change in the status of the 
key variables over time, for example, an increase or decrease in the degree of 
complexity of product parameters. 
The indicators of supplier capability require further explanation. Drawing on the 
technological capability (TC) literature (Lall 1992; Bell and Pavitt 1995), this study 
focuses on the type and level of capability possessed by suppliers. With regard to type, 
reflecting the capability requirements that the Japanese and Chinese organisational 
models impose on suppliers, the key distinction is between new product introduction 
(product development and design) and production. The latter is further divided into the 
equipment-related and production management dimensions (Sato and Fujita 2009). In 
terms of level, the focus will be on whether suppliers starting at routine operation for 
the domestic market (operational level) can progress to the level at which they are able 
to maintain stable and continuous operations that fulfil the requirements of foreign 
customers (assimilative level), and further to level at which suppliers are able to make 
minor yet original improvement to the existing products or production activities 
(adaptive level) (ibid.).   
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Table 2. Operationalisation of Concepts 
(a) Determinants of Governance Types 
Key Concepts Indicators 
Nature of 
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Level of 
Complexity  
General product characteristics (e.g. price levels) 
The way in which the lead firm specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Level of  
Standardisation  
General product features (e.g., whether product designs are 
proprietary or standardised) 
The way in which the lead firms specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Structure of 
Relevant 
Capabilities 
within the 
Industry 
Lead Firm 
Capability 
Whether or not the lead firm engages in key functions, e.g. product 
development, marketing, and production of core components 
The scale of orders placed to suppliers 
The capacity to switch suppliers 
Supplier 
Capability 
Changes in the number of suppliers, and types and levels of 
capability possessed 
(For new suppliers) Suppliers’ experience prior to entry into 
respective value chains  
(b) Governance Types 
  Pattern of Dependence Coordinating Mechanism 
Types of Data 
Required 
Lead firm: availability of 
alternative sources of 
components  
Suppliers: number of 
customers; percentage of sales 
to respective lead firms; size of 
orders 
Mechanisms used to communicate 
product/process parameters and ensure 
that they are met 
Markets 
Neither side is dependent on the 
other 
Limited communication of information 
beyond price levels 
Modular 
Communication of complex parameters 
without intense interaction enabled by 
industry-wide standards 
Relational Mutual interdependence  Intense two-way exchange of information 
Captive Small suppliers dependent on a large lead firm 
Lead firm takes the lead in sharing of 
long- and short-term targets; 
performance monitoring; regular sharing 
of information on products and 
processes; provision of 
technical/financial assistance 
Hierarchy Vertically integrated corporation Firm’s internal command 
Source: The author, with reference to Palpacuer (2000), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000), and Sako (1992).  
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4. Methodology 
This section explains the methodology adopted in the empirical research project, that is, 
the retrospective case study method, criteria for selection of cases, and methods of data 
collection and analysis.  
4.1 Research Design: Retrospective Case Study  
In order to analyse the decade-long dynamics of change in industrial organisation, this 
paper adopts the retrospective case study method (de Vaus 2001; Glick et al. 1995; 
Tuma and Hannan 1984). In the present context, this method involves tracing the 
processes of organisational transformation by observing the sequence of historical 
events occurring in specific sets of value chains with several intervals. Table 3 
provides a summary of the overall case study design. In an attempt to illuminate how 
and why the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation were transformed 
in the Vietnamese context over time, this study analyses two sets of value chains 
representative of the Japanese and Chinese models in Vietnam respectively. Each of 
them are analysed by means of an embedded case study design, which combines the 
analysis of the overall context with that of embedded subunits (Yin 2003). In 
accordance with the conceptual framework presented in the previous section, the focus 
is on the lead firm(s) and its/their main first-tier suppliers. 
The transplanted Japanese model is represented by value chains independently 
developed and governed by HVN for the following reasons. First, HVN remained the 
single most important motorcycle manufacturer in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
throughout the period of investigation (Figure 1). Second, among Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers in Vietnam, HVN was the hardest hit by the China shock but also 
reacted with the most fundamental adjustments. By contrast, YVN’s consistent focus 
on the high-end market limited direct Chinese competition (Fujita 2005); and Vietnam 
Suzuki (VNS)’s market shares were too small for the China shock to have an 
observable impact (Figure 1). 
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Table 3. Case Study Design 
  Japanese Model Chinese Model 
Cases HVN chains Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole 
Case 
Study 
Design 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of 
HVN value chains as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
HVN as the lead firm, and major 
Japanese (keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu) and Vietnamese 
suppliers 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of the local 
motorcycle assembly industry as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
(Stage II) Four major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A2, A4, and A5) and their Vietnamese, Taiwanese, 
and Korean suppliers  
(Stage III) Five major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A3, A4, A5, A6) and their Vietnamese, Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Korean suppliers 
Data 
Sources 
Context: interviews with Honda’s 
various units in Vietnam, Thailand 
and Japan; published and 
unpublished statistics; company 
website 
Embedded cases: interviews, 
factory visits, company websites, 
reports, newspapers 
Context: published and unpublished Vietnamese 
government statistics; reports; newspapers 
Embedded cases: interviews, factory visits, 
questionnaire surveys, company websites  
Source: The author. 
The case study of HVN’s value chain combined investigation of the overall context 
and that of embedded subunits including HVN as the lead firm, and major Japanese 
and Vietnamese suppliers. A total of 11 Japanese and 10 Vietnamese suppliers were 
purposefully selected as embedded subunits on the basis of the following criteria. First, 
cases were limited to suppliers of components that usually had model-specific designs, 
which, therefore, required close coordination between lead firms and suppliers. These 
included suppliers of metal and plastic components, dies, and moulds. Second, for the 
purpose of highlighting structural changes within the chains, cases were selected based 
on the requisite level of diversity: keiretsu and non-keiretsu suppliers among Japanese 
suppliers; state-owned and private companies among Vietnamese suppliers; and 
suppliers that had joined HVN value chains at various stages of industrial development. 
Third, an attempt was made to ensure that a sufficiently large number of cases were 
covered. The study ultimately selected 10 out of a total of 18 Vietnamese suppliers and 
11 out of a total of 26 Japanese suppliers operating in HVN's value chain as of 2007.17  
The Chinese model is represented by Vietnamese–Chinese chains developed by local 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers.18 Unlike the analysis of the Japanese model, the 
                                                   
17 These include Vietnamese suppliers V1-9 and V13 and Japanese suppliers J1-11. 
18 Lifan Vietnam, the only Chinese-invested motorcycle manufacturer, was not selected on account 
of its small market shares and its focus on engine production rather than motorcycle assembly (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 27).  
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focus is not limited to those value chains developed by specific lead firm(s) because 
their small size, repeated entry into and exit from the market, and the emergence of a 
shared supply base serving the local motorcycle assembly industry at large (see 
Section 6.2) calls for coverage of Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole.19  
Analysis of the Chinese model also combines that of context and embedded subunits. 
The former relies on analysis of the local motorcycle assembly industry as a whole. In 
respect of the latter, six local assemblers were selected from lists of those operating as 
of 2000 and 2006 respectively20 according to the following criteria. The first one was 
the critical case criterion, in which priority was given to assemblers that were 
sufficiently large in terms of the scale of production.  
Second, selection was based on two types of replication logic in case study research: 
literal replication (predicting similar results across cases) and theoretical replication 
(predicting contrasting results but for predictable reasons) (Yin 2003). Since 
assemblers’ product strategies and performance started to diverge at a late stage of 
industrial development, cases were selected to include assemblers adopting different 
product strategies and sourcing practices. On the basis of the author’s previous 
research (Fujita 2006), the key distinction was between one group of assemblers that 
concentrated on the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand motorcycles, 
and another group that prioritised quality improvement, and the development of own 
designs and brand names often at the expense of higher prices.  
Third, cases were selected so as to make use of data obtained from the author’s 
previous fieldwork, and accessibility to assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork. 
Since data from previous fieldwork only included information on three assemblers (A1, 
A4 and A5), attempts were made to incorporate additional embedded case assemblers 
that were known to have played major roles in stages II and III. Assembler A2, which 
in 2000 had had the largest turnover of 51 local assemblers,21 and assemblers A3 and 
A6, which were found to be expanding sales in Stage III, were added as embedded 
                                                   
19 The distinction between Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains is similar to the contrast 
drawn by Sturgeon and Lee (2005: 35) in reference to supplier networks in the automotive sector 
whereby Toyota’s supplier network competes with that of General Motors’ and the electronics 
industry, in which strategic outsourcing by groups of lead firms has led to the rise of a shared 
supply network. A striking feature of the present case is that contrasting supplier networks have 
emerged within a single industry.    
20 The 2000 list was provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry, and the 2006 list was 
provided by the General Statistics Office.  
21 Based on the list of local assemblers provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry. 
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cases.  
As a result of the selection process, the author ended up with six assemblers (A1-6) as 
embedded subunits. Assemblers A1, A2 and A3 belonged to one category of 
assemblers concentrating on the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand 
motorcycles. Assemblers A5 and A6 were typical examples of the other category of 
assemblers prioritising the development of own designs and brand names and quality 
improvement. Assembler A4 fell somewhere in between the two categories. 
Suppliers were also analysed as embedded subunits in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain. 
Data were obtained for a total of 24 suppliers of different nationalities (5 Chinese, 7 
Taiwanese, 1 Korean, and 11 Vietnamese).22 Attempts were made to ensure that cases 
included suppliers playing key roles in value chains developed by both of the 
aforementioned emergent groups of assemblers.  
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
In an attempt to analyse the trajectories of organisational transformation over the 
decade from the late 1990s, this study combined three main sources of data. The first 
dataset derived from the author’s previous fieldwork conducted in 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2005. Since the industry in question had undergone dramatic transformation 
involving many entries and exits, high staff turnover, and the frequent personnel 
changes typically observed in foreign affiliate, the present study would not have been 
possible without data from these previous rounds of fieldwork. Although they were 
driven by different research questions, they provided a great deal of information on 
lead firm production strategies and sourcing practices, lead firm–supplier relations, and 
the development of suppliers’ capabilities.  
Data obtained in previous rounds of fieldwork were compiled in the form of interview 
recordings, transcriptions, and notes (mainly from Vietnamese companies); interview 
notes (mainly from Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese companies); 
questionnaire surveys; notes taken during factory visits; company brochures and 
presentation materials; and other materials provided by firms. The present study 
therefore commenced with the interpretation and coding of existing materials in 
accordance with the operationalised indicators presented in Section 3. 
                                                   
22 These include Chinese suppliers C1-5, Taiwanese suppliers T1-7, Korean supplier K1 and 
Vietnamese suppliers V13-23.  
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Second, additional rounds of fieldwork were conducted specifically for the present 
study in order to collect data on new developments after 2005 and, wherever possible, 
to obtain retrospective data on earlier years. The basic strategy was to follow up with 
lead firms and suppliers approached in previous fieldwork, but attempts were also 
made to incorporate those that had not been included in the earlier studies but had 
come to play important roles in Stage III.23 Additional interviews with HVN and local 
assemblers, as well as their key suppliers, were also conducted between 2007 and 
2009.  
The fieldwork study of local assemblers requires further explanation. A major 
challenge was the difficulty in accessing assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork 
(A3, A4, and A6 agreed to be interviewed whilst A1 and A5 refused). The challenges 
were addressed by the following measures. One was to conduct questionnaire surveys 
of local assemblers in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam 
Academy of Social Science in 2007, to which A1, A3, A4, A5 and A6 agreed. Another 
was to access a former employee. Since access could be made to the former 
procurement manager (2002–4) of assembler A2, a series of interviews was conducted 
to obtain information on the company in the early 2000s.  
In order to complement limited amount and quality of data on local assemblers, the 
author also interviewed Taiwanese, Korean, Chinese and Vietnamese suppliers that had 
worked closely with these local assemblers over the years. The former transpired to be 
easier to access and became precious sources of information on Vietnamese–Chinese 
chains. Towards the last stage of the fieldwork, the author presented the main lines of 
argument on Vietnamese–Chinese chains to these suppliers and other industry experts 
and asked for their feedback. This exercise helped to confirm the validity of arguments 
and indicate where adjustment was necessary.  
The third source of data was that on local supplier capability which was collected for a 
different part of this research project focussing on trajectories of supplier capability 
formation.24 Of the 21 suppliers covered in the fieldwork on local suppliers, data for 18 
of them were revealed to be suitable for the present study.25 In-depth interviews were 
                                                   
23 Examples include local assemblers A3 and A6, and suppliers J10, J11, C1, V7, V9, and V16. 
Information on newly-emerging companies was obtained from newspapers and interviews with 
firms and industry experts.  
24 See Paper III in Fujita (2013b).  
25 The remaining three were second-tier suppliers to Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, which 
were beyond the scope of this study.  
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conducted with these 18 suppliers to identify the types and levels of capability 
acquired by such firms in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains at different stages 
of industrial development.  
The full list of firms interviewed and surveyed is included in Appendix. In addition to 
interviews and questionnaire surveys, this study also made use of the following 
additional data sources: published and unpublished statistics, Vietnamese and Japanese 
newspapers, reports and research papers on the industry, and presentations and lectures 
given by representatives of firms analysed as embedded cases.  
All the fieldwork materials were coded and tabulated using the indicators presented in 
Section 3. The following sections will present the results of the analysis as a synthesis 
of insights obtained from various levels of analysis. While individual firm-level case 
reports had been prepared in the course of the analysis, the details of the individual 
cases will be included only where necessary.  
5. The Emergence and Transformation of the Japanese Model in 
Vietnam 
Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical analyses of the transformation of Japanese and 
Chinese organisational models respectively in Vietnam. Each is structured in 
chronological order, with subsections running from earlier to later stages of industrial 
development. Each subsection begins by discussing the features of the two 
determinants of industrial organisation – namely, the nature of the product and the 
alignment of relevant capabilities – in the respective value chain at each stage of 
industrial development. It then goes on to analyse the form of industrial organisation 
that emerged under the prevailing conditions.   
Section 5 focuses specifically on how Honda, the leading global motorcycle 
manufacturer, transferred its conventional organisational model to Vietnam, and how it 
was transformed in the short- and the medium-term after its clash with the Chinese 
model. The discussion proceeds in the following order: 
 Stage I: the industry’s start-up phase, designed to observe the status of the 
transferred Japanese model before its clash with the emergent Chinese model  
 Stage II: the period of the China shock and its repercussions, designed to observe 
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the immediate response of actors in Japanese chains to the direct clash with the 
Chinese model  
 Stage III: the period of FDI-led development, designed to observe the 
medium-term impact of the clash with the Chinese model and the situation after 
unstable policy conditions impeding organisational adjustments were cleared  
5.1 Stage I: A ‘Foster Parent’ Variant Emerges 
The empirical analysis of the Japanese model begins with the assessment of Honda’s 
relations with its suppliers in the early years of its operation in Vietnam when the 
market was small and the local component supply base was underdeveloped. The 
following subsections examine how the company attempted to cope with the initial 
challenges and assess the key features of the emerging form of industrial organisation. 
5.1.1 The Need for Explicit Coordination: Non-standard Designs and High 
Quality 
Upon launching local production in Vietnam, Honda basically sought to replicate the 
conventional product strategy it had perfected in Japan and earlier overseas investment 
locations: launching its own sophisticated models developed at home and 
manufacturing them locally to high quality standards. In the 1990s, HVN launched two 
models in Vietnam, both of which carried proprietary (and thus non-standard) designs 
developed at the company’s R&D headquarters in Japan.26 One was adapted from an 
existing model produced in Thailand, and the other was developed exclusively for the 
Vietnamese market, carrying components customised to this particular model. The 
company also instituted its own component quality standards to be applied at its 
production bases in Asia.27  
Not only were product/process parameters idiosyncratic, they were also complex. 
HVN’s emphasis at this stage was clearly not on price competitiveness, the two models 
launched in the 1990s being priced as high as US$2,000.28 This reflected not only high 
quality levels but also a lack of scale economies, dependence on imported components, 
                                                   
26 This discussion of models launched in the1990s is based on an interview with HVN #2. 
27 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei Business Daily) Newspaper, 25 May 1999. 
28 The prices were US$1,990 and US$2,044 respectively (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). 
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and monopoly rents.29 Unsurprisingly, sales stagnated as price levels were far above 
the reach of ordinary citizens; while the limited number of consumers who could afford 
the high prices opted for Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand that were 
priced at broadly similar levels (Nguyen Tran Que and Hoa Huu Lan 1998). However, 
this did not lead HVN to adjust its product strategy at this stage.  
HVN’s emphasis on the non-price dimensions of competitiveness was confirmed by its 
suppliers. Detailed drawings provided by the company specified detailed product and 
process parameters (interviews with V1 #2, #4; V2 #1; V3 #1). As will be discussed in 
more detail below, none of the suppliers interviewed by the author were asked to 
reduce their prices at this stage.  
Apparently, Honda made limited effort to adapt its product strategy to the demands of 
Vietnamese consumers. After all, Vietnam was still a small, emerging market and the 
only major competitors were Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand. 
Stagnating sales notwithstanding, the company was not compelled to seriously 
reconsider its product strategy.   
5.1.2 Misaligned Capability/Power Structure 
As one of the world’s leading manufacturers of motorcycles since the 1960s, Honda 
enjoyed product and branding leadership that had remained unchallenged for decades. 
The company also controlled virtually all key value chain functions, including product 
development, designs of all components other than a limited number of core items, 
marketing, and branding (Fujita 2013a). As of the late 1990s, the company’s operations 
in Vietnam focussed on production, while product development and design were 
undertaken in Japan.  
Yet, even such product, technological and marketing leadership transpired to be 
insufficient for HVN to gain control over the Vietnamese market. As stated above, 
since its products were out of the reach of ordinary Vietnamese consumers, motorcycle 
sales stagnated in the 1990s (Figure 1). The fact that it was the single largest 
motorcycle manufacturer in Vietnam notwithstanding, HVN’s production in the 1990s 
remained small (Figure 4); indeed, far lower than 300,000 units per year – the level 
                                                   
29 A Vietnamese government inspection in 1998 found that HVN had earned profits of 
US$18,154,000 – or US$221 per vehicle sold (calculation by the author) – in the company’s second 
full year of operation (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 332).  
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generally recognised by Japanese manufacturers of motorcycle components as the 
minimum scale needed for efficient production (Mishima 2007). 
The Vietnamese government demanded that foreign motorcycle manufacturers expand 
local sourcing of components.30 To meet this requirement, Honda adopted its 
conventional approach of sourcing from the following two types of suppliers 
(interview with HVN #1), both of which transpired to be in short supply in Vietnam. 
First, Japanese suppliers – especially members of the Honda Group (keiretsu) – were 
preferred because of their proven record of manufacturing competence in serving 
Honda in Japan and abroad. However, despite indications that Honda explicitly or 
implicitly asked keiretsu suppliers to establish production bases in Vietnam 
notwithstanding (interviews with J6 #1; J7 #1), few of them did so because the country 
was still regarded as risky investment location (JETRO 1996; Ichikawa 2001) and the 
anticipated size of orders was too small.  
Figure 4. HVN’s Annual Motorcycle Production 
 
Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (various years).  
                                                   
30 Circular of the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment 1536/UB-VP dated 11August 
1994.  
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Second, Honda also sought to mobilise relatively large, well-established local 
companies. However, given the underdeveloped status of Vietnam’s mechanical 
industries at this stage,31 only four such firms were initially admitted into HVN’s value 
chain (Table 4). Even though they were relatively large and well-established by 
Vietnamese standards, none of them had previous experience of manufacturing 
machinery components or serving foreign customers. This is evident from Table 5, 
which shows production capabilities possessed by Vietnamese suppliers in Japanese 
chains including three of the four suppliers that were admitted into HVN’s chains in 
the 1990s (V1, V2 and V3).  
Consequently, HVN’s value chain remained underdeveloped. As of 1998, the local 
content ratio was only approximately 44% (Table 4), which included components that 
HVN manufactured in-house, the majority of parts being necessarily imported, mainly 
from Japan. In 1998, HVN’s supply networks in Vietnam only consisted of 16 first-tier 
suppliers: 12 Japanese companies, 5 of which belonged to the Honda Group,32 and 4 
local firms.  
Table 4. HVN’s Local Sourcing 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 
Local Content Ratio 44% 52% 83% 90% 
Total Number of Suppliers in Vietnam 16 20 43 58 
Japanese Suppliers 12 15 18 26 
  of which members of Honda Group 5 6 6 11 
Taiwanese and Korean Suppliers 0 0 12 14 
Vietnamese Suppliers 4 5 13 18 
  of which members of VEAM 0 0 1 3 
Note: VEAM (Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation) is a state-owned business 
group that contributes 30% capital to HVN. 
Source: The author’s interviews with HVN (#1, #2, #3). Suppliers belonging to the Honda Group 
and VEAM were respectively enumerated by the author on the basis of Toyo Keizai Inc. (2009) 
and VEAM's website (http://www.veam.com.vn/?act=thanhvien, accessed 1 August 2012). 
                                                   
31 This is evident from remarks made by experts who visited local Vietnamese companies engaged 
in processing metal, plastic and rubber products in 1995. Having visited nine major local 
companies, they remarked, “Visiting…local companies for the first time, we were surprised to find 
that their levels were far [lower] than the component manufacturers we have known and have 
instructed [in other Asian countries] in the past. We have come to think that instructing these 
companies will require a great deal of patience and new ideas” (JETRO 1996: 1). 
32 Suppliers J2, J6 and J10 even enjoyed direct capital investment from Honda’s Thai affiliate. 
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Table 5. Production-related Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in 
Japanese Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V1 Production of household plastic items Operational (n/a) Adaptive 
V2 Production of bicycle components Operational Operational - assimilative 
Assimilative- 
adaptive 
V3 Production of household metal items Operational Operational Assimilative 
V5 Production of household plastic items Operational Operational- assimilative 
V6 Production of wire harnesses for export to Japan Assimilative Adaptive 
V7 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
V8 (not yet established) Assimilative 
V9 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational 
V13 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
Notes:  
(1) n/a = data not available. 
(2) For the period prior to entry into a Japanese chain (the unshaded area), main lines of business 
are shown. 
(3) For the period after entry into a Japanese chain (the shaded area), the level of 
equipment-related and production management capabilities acquired by each supplier is shown. 
In case levels of the two types of capabilities differed, the lowest and highest levels.  
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers (Fujita 2013b).  
In short, Honda’s global leadership in product, technology and branding 
notwithstanding, the company had yet to establish sufficient market power to exert 
control over the albeit limited number of suppliers that possessed low levels of 
manufacturing competence.  
5.1.3 The Lead Firm as a Generous Provider of Assistance  
Limited lead firm control over the market combined with Vietnam’s dearth of 
component suppliers to constrain HVN in its attempts to exercise dominance. The 
result was a ‘foster parent’ variant of the captive model, whereby the lead firm relied 
primarily on the assurance of long-term orders, and the provision of technical and 
financial assistance to induce the suppliers’ commitment to meet its requirements.  
The key features of the emerging organisational model are evident from the pattern of 
lead firm–supplier dependence. On the one hand, the need to increase local contents in 
accordance with government requirements, combined with the difficulty of finding 
alternative domestic sources of components, meant that HVN was dependent to a great 
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extent on its incumbent suppliers. Given non-standard product parameters and demand 
below the minimum level required for efficient production, orders were commissioned 
straight to a fixed group of suppliers.  
On the other hand, supplier dependence on HVN varied (Table 6). Even with modest 
orders, Japanese suppliers were largely dependent on HVN as they had no other major 
customers. This was particularly the case with regard to members of Honda Group, 
who invested in Vietnam specifically with the aim of doing business with Honda.33 By 
contrast, local Vietnamese suppliers typically maintained the output of their traditional 
products. This was the practice of all of four Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the 
author that entered the HVN value chain in the 1990s; while business with HVN 
accounted for a relatively minor proportion of their sales (Table 6).  
As stated above, in order to induce suppliers’ commitment to achieve its targets, HVN 
played the role of a ‘foster parent’ – a generous provider of assistance. The company’s 
extensive use of assistance at this stage is evident from the author’s interviews with 
suppliers. For members of the Honda Group, patronage took the form of financial 
support. This was a means by which HVN could reward its suppliers for taking the risk 
of investing in the equipment and/or training required specifically for serving Honda; 
given that the company was unable to provide suppliers with what they most wanted: 
large and stable orders. Two of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed (J2 and J3) 
pointed out that HVN had applied preferential prices for the first few years so that they 
could gain a quick return on their investments. As a result, supplier J3 recorded a profit 
as early as the second year of operation (interview #1), and supplier J2 completely 
eliminated its losses by the early 2000s (interview #2). 
For local Vietnamese suppliers, patronage took the form of technical assistance. 
Without the provision of such help over an extended period, it was virtually impossible 
for local Vietnamese companies to meet HVN’s requirements. All of the four 
Vietnamese companies selected by HVN as first-tier suppliers upon the launch of its 
local production were interviewed by the author at different times. They had all 
received technical assistance, typically in the form of repeated visits of experts to their 
factories over a few years to provide advice and suggestions (interviews with suppliers 
V1 #1; V2 #1, #2; V3 #1, #2; V4 #1). 
                                                   
33 Three of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed by the author explicitly mentioned that 
they invested in Vietnam with the aim of serving Honda (interviews with J2 #1, #2; J6 #1; J7 #1). 
No information was available on the remaining supplier (J3). 
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Table 6. Suppliers’ Dependence on HVN 
(a) Japanese Suppliers 
Name 
Honda 
Group 
Start 
of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J1 * 1997 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
2nd 
(reorganised 
into J10) 
100% 
dependent on 
HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN. Orders for 
increased variety of components and 
types of processing required.  
(Reorganised into supplier J10 in 2005.) 
J2 * 1997 Silencers 3rd 3th 
100% 
dependent on 
HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. Orders for increased variety 
of components. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
Further increase in variety of components. 
J3 * 1997 
Brake 
system 
7th 7th 
Highly 
dependent on 
HVN. 
Highly dependent on HVN but started 
exporting components to Japan.  
Dependent on HVN for 52% of sales while 
exports increased to 23%. Increased orders 
for sophisticated components from HVN. 
J4   1997 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not 
included) 
(bankrupt in 
2004) 
(n/a) 
Highly dependent on HVN but traded 
with VNS, YVN and manufacturers of 
consumer electronic products.  
(Bankrupt in 2004.) 
J5   1997 
Plastic 
components 
 
(not 
included) 
 
(not included) (n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales 
but traded with YVN and consumer 
electronics manufacturers. 
Dependence on HVN decreased to 20%. 
Increased production of electronic 
components. 
J6 * 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
4th 1st 
Almost 
completely 
dependent on 
HVN 
Highly dependent on HVN but also 
supplied limited quantities to YVN and 
VNS. Lost orders for certain types of 
components upon the launch of the 
Wave Alpha but recovered them within 
a few years. 
Dependent on Honda for 95% of sales 
(including HVN for 85% and exports for 
10%). Orders for increased variety of 
components. 
J7 * 1998 
Electronic 
components 
5th 2nd (n/a) Dependent on HVN for 65% of sales. (n/a) 
J8   1998 
Plastic 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not included) 
Many 
customers in 
other industries 
Many customers in electronics and other 
industries. 
(n/a) 
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Table 6. Continued     
Name 
Honda 
Group 
Start 
of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by turnover Dependence on HVN 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J9 
 
2001 
Aluminium 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not included) (n/a) (n/a) 
90% of sales in 2006 from motorcycle 
components, including supply to HVN and 
YVN. Volume and variety of orders from 
HVN reduced by 2008. 
J10 * 2004 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
(not yet 
established) 
4th 
(not yet 
established) 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
J11 * 2005 
Transmissio
n 
(not yet 
established) 
35th 
(not yet 
established) 
(not yet established) 100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
(b) Vietnamese Suppliers 
Name 
VEAM 
Member 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stages I to II Stage III 
V1   1997 
Plastic 
components 
and moulds 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependence on HVN increased 
from 16% in 2001 to 41% in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Orders for 
high-precision components and moulds since 2006. Orders from 
buyers in other industries also increased. 
V2   1997 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included) 
13th 
Dependence on motorcycle 
components increased from 22% in 
1998 to 85% in 2003 (mostly 
HVN). 
Dependent on motorcycle components for 87% of sales in 2008. 
Increased volume and variety of orders from HVN and its suppliers. 
V3   1997 
Metal 
components 
12th 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for 60% of sales in 
2001 (mostly HVN). 
Dependent on HVN for 50–60% of sales. Volume of orders increased 
but concentrated on components requiring relatively simple 
processing. 
V4   1997 
Metal stamped 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependence on HVN increased 
from 30–40% in the 1990s to 70% 
in 2002. Volume and variety of 
orders increased. 
Dependence on HVN reduced to 40–45% in 2008. Volume and 
variety of orders not increased while supplier expanded transactions 
in other products. 
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Table 6. Continued     
Name 
VEAM 
Member 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2002 Stages I to II Stage III 
V5   2000 
Plastic 
components  
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for less than 10% of 
sales in 2002 (mostly HVN). 
Dependence on HVN increased to 40% in 2007. Orders falling by 
2008 and concentrated on components requiring relatively simple 
processing. 
V6  2001 Wire harnesses 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Volume and content of 
orders unchanged. 
V7 * 2001 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on HVN for 42% of 
sales in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 60% of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V8 
 
2004 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(not yet established) Dependent on HVN for virtually 100% of sales in 2008. 
V9 * 2005 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for one-third of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V13 * 2004 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included) 
45th 
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for 80% of sales in 2008. Orders increased in 
volume and variety. 
Notes: 
(1) ‘Ranking by Turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in lists provided by 
the General Statistics Office.  
(2) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other industries 
because their main product lines were not motorcycle components. 
Source: The author’s interviews. 
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For its part, HVN made relatively limited use of its ability to impose demanding 
requirements on its suppliers – a key feature of the captive model. While HVN’s 
quality stipulations constituted a challenge to most local suppliers, they were given 
ample time to study procedures and strive to reach the requisite standards (interview 
with V2 #1). The small volume of orders also meant that delivery requirements were 
loose, a factor that is evident from the author’s interview with supplier J3, one of the 
Honda Group suppliers. 
In those days [the 1990s], when we could not make the delivery deadline specified 
by HVN, our local staff even requested them to adjust their production timetable. 
Now [at the time of the interview i.e. 2004] it is difficult to imagine that such a 
practice was going on.       (J3 #1) 
In summary, HVN’s differentiated, proprietary products called for explicit governance 
mechanisms. Even though HVN remained the sole coordinator of its value chain, the 
limited volume of orders and an underdeveloped local component supply base 
constrained it in the establishment of its dominance in terms of imposing challenging 
targets on its suppliers. The outcome was that HVN adopted the role of a ‘foster parent’ 
in attempting to nurture the capabilities of its suppliers. Moreover, in the absence of 
major competitors, HVN was not compelled to reconsider its strategies at this stage. 
5.2 Stage II: Partial Transformation of the ‘Foster Parent’ Variant 
This subsection considers Honda’s short-term response to the new challenges posed by 
the China shock. Faced with the need to spur price-based competitiveness, HVN 
sought to adjust its organisational model but such an attempt only produced limited 
progress at this stage. The following examines the factors that drove HVN’s 
organisational adjustment as well as those that impeded it, and discusses the form of 
industrial organisation that emerged out of the adjustment.  
5.2.1 Impetus for Transformation: Radical Price Reduction 
The impetus for organisational change came from a radical shift in emphasis of HVN’s 
product strategy from non-price to price-based competitiveness. When the Vietnamese 
market began to be flooded with massive numbers of low-priced imitation motorcycles, 
for the first time, Honda realised the huge unexploited demand at the bottom end of 
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low-income markets like Vietnam. This led Honda to initiate a company-wide effort to 
develop a low-priced model in an attempt to prevent the entry of Chinese motorcycles 
into Southeast Asia, where the Japanese company had held market leadership for 
decades (Higashi 2006; Sato 2011). In collaboration with the R&D headquarters and 
mother factory in Japan and production base in Thailand, Honda’s regional R&D base 
in Thailand developed a low-priced model with exceptional acceleration (Ohara et al. 
2003; Ohara 2006b). Priced at approximately one-third of HVN’s existing models,34 
the Wave Alpha was launched in Vietnam in January 2002.  
The launch of this low-priced model had significant impact on parameters imposed on 
suppliers. On the one hand, the complexity of parameters was reduced. Price reduction 
targets demanded by HVN upon the launch of the Wave Alpha on four of the Honda 
Group suppliers of core components interviewed by the author ranged between 40% 
and 50% (Table 7), which was far beyond the targets achieved by routine incremental 
improvements in productivity.  
Table 7. Responses of Honda Group Suppliers to the Launch of the Wave Alpha 
Name 
Price Reduction 
Margin 
Requested by 
HVN 
Supplier’s Response to HVN’s 
Requests Results 
J2 40% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders. 
The supplier decided to accept 
HVN’s targets before actually 
coming up with ways of meeting 
them.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component.  
J3 50% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders, 
even if the supplier initially incurred 
losses.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component. It 
later came up with ways to 
achieve cost reduction. 
J6 (n/a) 
The supplier made internal attempts 
at cost reduction and suggestions for 
specification changes to HVN.  
The supplier only won orders 
for 3 of 16 existing types of 
component. 
J7 40% 
The supplier provided quotations in 
accordance with the extent of cost 
reduction it could achieve.  
The supplier lost orders for one 
of two existing types of 
component but won orders for 
other components as it was able 
to meet HVN’s target price. 
Source: The author’s interviews (J2 #1; J3 #1; J6 #1; J7 #1). 
In the meantime, in order to achieve such a radical cost reduction, Honda reduced its 
                                                   
34 Upon its initial launch, the price of the Wave Alpha (US$719) was 36% of the official price of 
HVN’s most popular model, the Super Dream, in 2000 (US$1,990) (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). 
This was followed by the launch of a low-priced model in Thailand in June 2002, the Wave 100.  
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product specifications to the levels considered necessary for the Vietnamese market. 
For example, the maximum driving speed applied in defining product and process 
parameters for the Wave Alpha was set at 80 kilometres per hour. Even though this was 
much lower than standard levels applied to Honda’s other overseas markets, it was 
considered sufficient for use in the Vietnamese context where traffic congestion 
prevented motorcycle use at higher speeds (Amano and Shintaku 2010: 799).  
On the other hand, the non-standard nature of parameters was maintained. With the 
aim of reducing product development costs, Honda made extensive use of component 
designs utilised in its existing models (Ohara et al. 2003) rather than renewing the 
whole vehicle system – the conventional Japanese approach to product development 
(Fujita 2013a). However, the Wave Alpha was still non-standard in the sense that 
component designs were customised to Honda.     
In summary, HVN’s priority shifted from quality to price reduction. The company’s 
product and process parameters were still non-standard but less complex than in the 
previous stage, and thus could be communicated between the lead firm and its 
suppliers with relative ease.  
5.2.2 Lead Firm Attempts at Realigning Capabilities 
The shift in HVN’s production strategy was accompanied by corresponding changes to 
the structure of the company’s value chain. In order to reduce component procurement 
costs, HVN sought to substantially expand sources in Vietnam and abroad (interview 
#2). Apart from the need to exploit new sources of lower-priced components, 
expanding local sourcing became a priority, as this enabled HVN to save on import 
tariffs and to conform to the local content stipulations implemented by the Vietnamese 
government in the early 2000s. Increasing the number of suppliers – especially those 
with high levels of price-based competitiveness – was also expected to put competitive 
pressure on incumbent suppliers.35 
Since one could hardly expect Japanese FDI in component manufacturing to increase 
immediately (Ichikawa 2001), HVN inevitably had to depend on non-conventional 
                                                   
35 This effect is clearly illustrated in an interview with Japanese keiretsu supplier J2 #1 in 2002. 
Noting that Honda was engaged in an extensive search for new suppliers, the general director 
commented that the price-based competitiveness of local suppliers would pose a real threat to 
Japanese companies.   
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component sources in expanding local supply. The remarkable increase in HVN’s local 
content ratio from 52% in 2001 to 83% in 2004 (Table 4) was achieved primarily by 
incorporating non-Japanese suppliers into the company’s value chain. As Honda 
engaged in an extensive search for suppliers in Vietnam by mobilising experts from 
Japan,36 numerous Taiwanese, Korean and Vietnamese suppliers were admitted into the 
company’s value chain (Table 4). Another noteworthy development was that HVN 
sought to import components for the first time from China. Upon the launch of the 
Wave Alpha, HVN sourced 27 types of component from local Chinese companies 
servicing Honda’s joint venture motorcycle manufacturer in China (interview #2).  
While the above developments might look impressive, the key question is the extent to 
which such adjustments changed the alignment of relevant capabilities and power 
relations between lead firm and suppliers. Apparently, HVN hoped to achieve two aims 
simultaneously: to enhance its purchasing power, and to spur price-based competition 
between suppliers. Both conditions had to be met if HVN were to exploit market forces 
whilst maintaining its non-standard product and process parameters. However, this 
strategy only achieved partial success at this stage because the company was prevented 
from realigning the necessary structure of capabilities to achieve these aims.  
On the one hand, by reducing prices, HVN sought to rapidly expand its sales volume, 
which would not only enable the lead firm and its suppliers to realise economies of 
scale but also allow HVN to exercise purchasing power over its suppliers. Indeed, this 
seemed a likely scenario in 2002.37 However, HVN’s ambitions were blocked by a 
series of restrictions introduced by the Vietnamese government from 2002 onwards on 
motorcycle registration and the capacity expansion of foreign invested motorcycle 
manufacturers (as discussed in Section 2.3). The resultant slow growth of the market as 
well as HVN’s inability to invest in expansion of production capacity meant that the 
company’s annual production increased modestly. In fact, it had only reached some 
400,000 units by 2004 – above the 300,000-unit minimum level required for 
economically viable non-capital-intensive production but barely sufficient for the lead 
firm to exercise purchasing power over suppliers.  
                                                   
36 The search for potential suppliers conducted in the years 2001–2 was the most extensive in 
HVN’s history to date, covering as many as 80 companies (interview with HVN #4). 
37 A few Japanese suppliers noted that in 2002 they had been requested by HVN to prepare for 
rapid capacity expansion (interviews with J2 #1; #2; J4 #1), which clearly demonstrates HVN’s 
ambitions before quantitative restrictions on imports of components were imposed (Section 2.3). 
Also, when HVN’s annual production exceeded one million units in 2007, the company’s 
administrative manager noted, “We could finally achieve what we had endeavoured to achieve for a 
long time” (interview HVN #3). 
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On the other hand, HVN’s attempt to increase the number of suppliers was aimed at 
breaking its dependence on incumbent suppliers and spurring competition between 
them as well as new ones. Again, this strategy was thwarted by the limited 
manufacturing capabilities of newly admitted suppliers together with the 
aforementioned small purchase volume. While some Taiwanese suppliers had good 
track records of supplying components to Honda in Taiwan (interview with HVN #2), 
only one of the four Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the author and admitted to 
HVN’s value chain in Stage II had ever served foreign customers (Table 5).  
The shortage of supplier capability had to be dealt with by lead firm intervention in the 
form of technical assistance. However, as will be discussed below, quality problems 
recorded by several suppliers – those in China in particular – were so serious that HVN 
was eventually compelled to stop placing orders with them (interview #2) – the sort of 
decision Honda makes only in truly exceptional circumstances (interview #3). By 2004, 
only a few types of components – as opposed to 27 upon the initial launch of the Wave 
Alpha – were imported from China (interview with HVN #2).  
In the meantime, the radical price reduction targets announced by HVN upon 
launching of the Wave Alpha compelled the incumbent suppliers – including those 
belonging to Honda Group – to take urgent measures to reduce production costs. All 
such suppliers interviewed by the author, both Japanese and Vietnamese, eventually 
achieved HVN’s price reduction targets with their own cost reduction efforts.38 For 
instance, supplier J6 won contracts for only three out of the sixteen types of 
components upon the initial launching of the Wave Alpha, but because of significant 
productivity improvements, company won back contracts for all of the remaining 
thirteen types of components by 2004 (interview #1). 
In short, HVN’s attempt at realigning capability within its chain with the aim of 
achieving substantial cost reduction was only partially successful at this stage; first, 
because government policy impeded HVN in expanding production; and second, 
because supplier capabilities took time to develop. 
 
                                                   
38 Examples of measures taken by interviewed suppliers to achieve targets include the localisation 
of imported components and materials; productivity improvement in plant operations; and 
downward adjustments to product and/or process specifications (subject to Honda’s approval) 
(interviews with J2 #1; J3 #1; J6 #1). 
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5.2.3 The Constant Struggle to Introduce Market Forces 
As a result of the partial realignment of capabilities, the emerging pattern of 
transactional governance was shaped by a tension between the need to achieve radical 
price reduction – which called for increased use of market forces – and absence of the 
capability alignment required for the effective functioning of market forces. 
HVN’s attempts at making use of market forces may be clearly observed in the 
company’s ordering procedure upon the launch of the Wave Alpha, orders being no 
longer commissioned straight to a fixed group of suppliers but based on competition 
determined by price. Prior to the launch of the new model, HVN announced radical 
price reduction targets and asked for quotations from an increased number of suppliers 
(interviews with J2 #1; J3 #1; J7 #1). Table 7 summarises the responses of four 
incumbent suppliers, all of which had direct capital relations with Honda. They were 
thus compelled to meet a price reduction target ranging between 40% and 50% or risk 
losing orders. In this regard, in 2004, the general director of supplier J6 recalled: 
“[Upon launching of the Wave Alpha,] we received pressure [from Honda that they] 
would switch to Taiwanese, Korean, or Chinese suppliers if we could not achieve the 
target prices” (interview #1). In August 2002, the general manager of supplier J2 
indeed admitted that the decision was whether to accept the cost reduction target 
presented by Honda or to lose orders (interview #1). 
However, responses varied. Suppliers J2 and J3 strove to meet targets on the 
understanding that they would be obliged to sacrifice profits or even incur losses 
during initial years. On the other hand, suppliers J6 and J7 gave up supplying some of 
the components for which they were asked by HVN to provide quotations. The fact 
that even supplier J6, with which Honda had direct capital and personnel relations, 
won orders for only 3 out of the 16 types of component that the company had 
previously supplied to HVN illustrates the lead firm’s determination to trade with the 
cheapest available source regardless of nationality or keiretsu ties.39 This marked an 
important shift away from Honda’s conventional sourcing practices. Indeed, suppliers 
were expected to independently come up with measures to meet the stringent targets 
imposed on them, financial support previously granted to such suppliers having been 
                                                   
39 An important point to note is that most of the components adopted in the Wave Alpha carried 
designs previously developed for Honda’s pre-existing models (Ohara et al. 2003). The fact that 
suppliers had not participated in component design processes is likely to have been a key 
consideration behind the sourcing approach adopted for this particular model.  
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terminated by this stage.   
Although the above changes in HVN’s ordering practices might look impressive, the 
new alignment of lead firm and supplier capabilities prevented the sustained operation 
of price-based competition, a situation that eventually led to the revival of previous 
patterns of dependence. First, HVN’s limited purchase volume meant that dual 
sourcing was not feasible: to the extent that non-standard component designs were 
maintained, parts could be simultaneously sourced from more than one supplier only 
when the size of production was sufficiently large to allow each of the suppliers to 
exploit economies of scale. HVN regarded this threshold to be the annual production of 
one million units (interviews #3, #4), an output level that, as discussed above, had not 
been reached by the end of Stage II.  
Second, as noted in Section 5.2.2, the limited manufacturing capability of newly 
admitted suppliers posed a serious constraint to HVN’s attempts to use them to spur 
competition between suppliers. This, combined with the efforts of incumbent suppliers 
to meet HVN targets, resulted in the revival of the traditional mutual dependence 
between the lead firm and its old suppliers.  
Third, limited supplier capabilities also forced HVN to continue to act as a ‘foster 
parent’ or provider of technical assistance. New entrants were offered technical 
assistance in the form of periodic monitoring and joint problem-solving exercises 
(interviews with V5 #1; V7#1); although the time frame of assistance was found to be 
generally shorter than it had been in respect of suppliers entering HVN value chain in 
the 1990s, the former – as discussed above – extending for between one and two years, 
while the latter was approximately six months (interviews with V5 #1; V7#1).  
The above findings show that the magnitude of short-term adjustment was not as 
substantial as the existing literature suggests after all. While HVN’s response to the 
China shock did include a number of radical changes to conventional sourcing 
practices, they were largely emergency measures intended to deal with immediate 
needs. Within a few years, it became apparent that the existing capability structure 
constrained the sustained functioning of market forces, the result being the revival of 
traditional patterns of dependence and persistence of lead firm assistance. 
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5.3 Stage III: Transformation into an ‘Institutionalised Competition’ Variant 
As the industry entered the phase of rapid FDI-led development, fundamental changes 
took place in HVN’s value chain. The company’s attempts to introduce market forces 
into transactional governance, which had only partially succeeded in the previous stage, 
culminated in what the present study refers to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ 
variant of the captive model. This variant of the captive organisation systematically 
combines the advantages of long-term, close relations with a fixed group of suppliers 
and the benefits of market forces with the aim of extracting constant performance 
improvement out of suppliers. The following subsections describe and explain the 
transformation of HVN’s value chain during this most dynamic stage; analysis that no 
previous study has explicitly attempted.  
5.3.1 Shifting Market Demand: The Increasing Complexity of Parameters 
The third stage of industrial development was characterised by increasing 
sophistication of consumer demand. As a result of rising levels of income and serious 
quality problems experienced with Chinese motorcycles in the early 2000s, urban 
Vietnamese consumers began to aspire to a better quality of motorcycle, while demand 
for low-priced imitations was limited to low-income consumers in rural areas (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007).  
In response to the changing market landscape, Honda implemented a number of 
important adjustments to its product strategy. First, the complexity of product 
parameters increased. Reflecting the growing market, the number of new models 
launched by HVN increased substantially by Stage III (Table 8). In order to respond to 
the increasing sophistication of consumers, HVN launched a greater number of models 
that adopted new component technologies, higher precision levels, and/or renewed 
external styling (interview with HVN #4). These changes were reflected in price levels: 
HVN models launched between 2006 and 2008 were priced between US$932 and 
US$1,564 – higher than the increased price of the Wave Alpha (US$807) in 2007.40 
Second, process parameters also grew more complex. HVN’s emphasis shifted from 
the one-off radical price reduction in the previous stage to incremental yet continuous 
improvement in overall QCD levels. Of these three criteria, the highest priority was 
attached to quality levels. Asked about the company’s focus in 2007, HVN’s manager 
                                                   
40 Prices quoted in various issues of Oto-Xe May (Automobiles and Motorcycles). 
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remarked:  
[Of QCD], quality is the most important. Since Vietnamese consumers demand 
very high levels of quality, we need to keep on paying close attention to [our] 
quality levels…We emphasise quality at source. That is, we ask suppliers to 
guarantee quality levels within their production processes.      (HVN #3) 
 
Table 8. New Models Registered by Year 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
HVN 2 1 5 6 9 17 27 35 102 
Local Assembler A1 28 11 4 28 105 112 191 66 545 
Local Assembler A2 19 15 0 10 8 8 15 0 75 
Local Assembler A3 10 1 5 25 43 56 112 8 260 
Local Assembler A4 8 6 4 8 23 16 9 9 83 
Local Assembler A5 19 9 4 7 8 21 15 3 86 
Local Assembler A6 0 1 2 5 10 12 10 1 41 
Source: The author, from data obtained from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), 
accessed 6 January 2009. 
It is worth emphasising that HVN began to demand that suppliers ensure quality at 
source. This was in sharp contrast to the company’s standards in Stage II, when it 
tolerated defects in components imported from China so long as price advantages 
outweighed the cost of inspecting 100% of the parts (interview with HVN #2). 
However, such preoccupation with quality does not mean that price was no longer 
important. Unlike the one-off cost reduction in the early 2000s, suppliers were now 
requested to achieve incremental cost reductions of 5% every year (interview with 
HVN #5). With a growing volume of orders (see below), delivery deadlines also 
became increasingly tight, most Japanese and some Vietnamese suppliers being 
required to implement ‘just in time’ delivery several times a day.41  
In terms of degree of standardisation, the non-standard nature of product parameters 
was maintained. However, since approximately 2004, the company’s regional R&D 
base in Thailand started to make extensive use of common component designs for 
internal parts across models to be launched in Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam 
(interview with Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1). Whilst this marked a significant move 
away from the Honda’s conventional approach to the renewal of most component 
                                                   
41 The frequency of deliveries in 2007–2008 ranged between 5–8 times a day (interviews with 
suppliers J2 #2; J3 #3; J6 #2; J10 #1; V1 #3). 
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designs when launching new models, the fresh approach enabled the company to 
develop large varieties of models at low cost, while realising economies of scale in 
manufacturing (ibid.).  
In short, HVN’s product and process parameters became increasingly complex, 
extending to non-price dimensions and demanding in terms of requisite levels. While 
component designs continued to be specific to Honda, the use of common parts across 
models laid the foundations for the realisation of economies of scale in manufacturing 
and lead firm purchasing power over suppliers.  
5.3.2 Full Realignment of the Capability Structure 
Whilst shifting demand certainly influenced the direction and degree of organisational 
transformation, even more important was the driver for change coming from within the 
value chain: the shifting alignment of capabilities. This occurred partly as a result of 
HVN’s active attempt to create the necessary conditions for transforming its ‘foster 
parent’ model of industrial organisation, and partly as a result of incidental changes in 
Vietnamese government policy that were beyond the company’s control.  
On the one hand, the policy changes discussed above led to significant expansion of 
the market as a whole, as well as HVN’s market shares in particular. As the 
government abandoned a series of legislation that had repressed the overall market 
growth, sales of motorcycles increased rapidly, even exceeding levels during the China 
shock (Figure 1). Japanese lead firms expanded their shares as they were released from 
constraints on expansion of production capacity. HVN’s annual production in 
particular exceeded one million units by 2007 (Figure 4). This was an important 
landmark because such purchase volume not only exceeded the minimum efficient 
scale even for components requiring capital-intensive production processes, but also 
called for the dual sourcing of each type of component (interviews with HVN #3, #4). 
Accordingly, HVN started to exercise huge purchasing power over its suppliers.  
On the other hand, the number of suppliers in Vietnam as well as their overall 
capability levels increased remarkably. First, as a consequence of the rapid market 
expansion, FDI from component suppliers with established records of serving Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers increased, including Honda Group suppliers that had 
previously been hesitant to invest in Vietnam. Of the total of 38 investment licences 
granted to Japanese motorcycle component manufacturers between 1992 and 2007, as 
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many as 20 projects were licensed between 2004 and 2007.42  
Second, as a result of HVN’s attempts to mobilise and nurture local suppliers from the 
late 1990s, the capability levels of Vietnamese firms improved substantially. This is 
clear from the author’s in-depth case studies of HVN’s first-tier Vietnamese suppliers 
(Table 5). By Stage III, most of the suppliers had reached the assimilative level whilst 
some even progressed to the adaptive level for one or more dimension of their 
production activities. Such improvement in the production-related capabilities of local 
suppliers is corroborated by the assessment of HVN managers. In 2009, the company’s 
procurement manager remarked that, with a number of exceptions, local Vietnamese 
suppliers were generally able to meet its requirements without the hands-on technical 
assistance (interview #5).  
As a result of the increased number of suppliers in Vietnam and their improved 
capability levels, HVN’s local content ratio and number of suppliers increased rapidly, 
with the former reaching 90% and the latter reaching 58 by 2007 (Table 4). However, 
even more significant were the structural changes within the value chain. Having 
obtained the ability to switch suppliers, HVN reorganised its value chain, adopting 
differentiated approaches to the following three different groups of suppliers – with 
emphasis on what HVN manager referred to as “group suppliers” (interview #5).  
The first group consisted of Honda group (keiretsu) suppliers. Among the embedded 
cases, J2, J3, J6, J7, J10 and J11 belonged to this category. Having proprietary 
component design and/or manufacturing competencies that Honda relied upon, their 
parent companies in Japan had developed a long-term association with the former 
mediated by capital and personnel relations.  
The second group was Honda’s joint venture partner, Vietnam Engine and Agricultural 
Machinery (VEAM) Corporation, a state-owned business group consisting of more 
than 20 member companies, traditionally specialising in the production of diesel 
engines and agricultural machinery. Among the embedded cases, suppliers V7, V9, 
V13, and V14 belonged to this business group. Although VEAM members did not 
possess complementary competencies, HVN started to attach growing priority to them 
as an integral part of its extended corporate group (interview #5). Apart from direct 
capital ties, high levels of manufacturing competence relative to other local suppliers, a 
                                                   
42 Calculated by the author using data provided by the Ministry of Planning and Investment of 
Vietnam, which is available in tabulated form in Fujita (2008). 
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sense of trust that had been built through long-term relations as a joint venture partner, 
and the executive with a good understanding of Japanese management practices and 
willing to expand business with Japanese companies also account for HVN’s 
preference to outsource key components to VEAM members (interview with HVN #5).   
The third group consisted of suppliers of non-core components, of all nationalities. 
These suppliers were expected to provide external manufacturing capacity. Suppliers 
J4, J5, J8, J9, V1–6 and V8 fell under this category.  
Suppliers belonging to the first two groups received increasing priority in Stage III. 
They not only accounted for nearly half of suppliers newly admitted into HVN’s value 
chain between 2004 and 2007 (Table 4) but also began to receive a mounting 
proportion of HVN’s expanded orders. Indeed, Honda Group suppliers received 
increasing orders not only for core- but also non-core components that had previously 
been subcontracted to Group 3 suppliers.43 In localising the production of 
high-precision engine components, HVN designated two VEAM suppliers (V7 and 
V9) to undertake the initial processing of these components (interviews with HVN #4, 
#5). 
In addition to the shifting alignment of supplier capability, progress in Vietnamese 
trade liberalisation provided HVN with potential access to overseas sources of 
suppliers, although they remained an unused option at this stage. As part of the 
country’s bid to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Vietnam 
had dismantled local content rules by the end of 2003, and, in accordance with the 
tariff reduction schedule under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), Vietnam reduced its tariffs on most motorcycle components 
imported from ASEAN-6 countries from 50% in 2005 to 5% in 2006.44  
Although the high levels of HVN’s local content ratio after 2006 are an illustration of 
                                                   
43 In addition to Table 6, the following case provides a clear illustration. After J10 – 100% owned 
by Honda – was established in 2005 to manufacture a large variety of components, supplier J9 – a 
Japanese non-keiretsu provider of non-core components – was requested to supply sub-components 
to J10 instead of directly to HVN as the company had done previously. Supplier J9 lost further 
orders for sub-components after 2007 as supplier J10 started to manufacture them in-house 
(interview with J9 #1).  
44 ASEAN-6 includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
While motorcycle components had long been excluded from Vietnam’s tariff reduction schedule for 
AFTA, the Vietnamese government announced a schedule for these items for the first time at the 
end of 2004 (Government Decree 213/2004/ND-CP dated 27 December 2004). 
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the company’s preference to source the bulk of its motorcycle parts locally, the 
company now had the option of importing components at competitive prices from 
Thailand and Indonesia – the two countries with the most advanced automotive 
component supply bases in Southeast Asia.45 Moreover, with the expectation that trade 
liberalisation under the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area would progress in the 
not-too-distant future, Honda was eager to make a second attempt at sourcing 
components from China. Its procurement manger emphasised that limited 
manufacturing capabilities possessed by suppliers in China – the main reason for the 
failure of the first trial upon the launch of the Wave Alpha – had improved to a 
considerable extent by 2008 (interview with HVN #4).  
To sum up, the distribution of lead firm and supplier capabilities changed substantially 
as a result of both HVN’s active attempts to realign capabilities within the industry and 
incidental policy changes. With its huge purchasing power and accumulating supplier 
capability, HVN gained the capacity to reorganise its suppliers in accordance with its 
requirements. 
5.3.3 An ‘Institutionalised Competition’ Variant Emerges 
The shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to implement organisational 
adjustments to meet changing product and process requirements. The result was a form 
of organisation referred to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ variant of the captive 
chain. Key changes in transactional governance were three-fold.  
First, the level of supplier dependence on HVN increased substantially regardless of 
the type of supplier. The large volume of orders meant that suppliers were increasingly 
dependent on HVN for their sales. By Stage III, this was the case not only with Honda 
Group suppliers but also local Vietnamese suppliers. Local suppliers like V2, V3, V7, 
V8, and V13 depended on HVN and its related companies for between 50% and 100% 
of their sales (Table 6).  
Second, HVN’s provision of technical assistance diminished and was substituted with 
less generous forms of lead firm engagement with suppliers: collaborative initiatives 
                                                   
45 Thailand has established itself as the hub of the Southeast Asian automotive industry (Lecler 
2002; Higashi 2006). With the largest motorcycle market in Southeast Asia and a longer history of 
industrialisation, Indonesia is also more advanced than Vietnam in terms of the development of the 
component industry (Sato 2011).  
 
 
52 
 
for achieving incremental productivity improvement, referred to as value analysis (VA) 
and value engineering (VE);46 systematic monitoring of supplier performance; and 
joint problem-solving exercises in the cases of troubles (interviews with HVN #4, #5). 
All three of the aforementioned groups of suppliers were subject to stringent QCD 
performance targets, which were incrementally upgraded every year (ibid.). Since most 
suppliers were more or less capable of reaching such targets, technical assistance 
beyond systematic monitoring and troubleshooting was offered only selectively with 
regard to strategically important targets. Group 2 suppliers became strategic targets as 
they were subcontracted high-precision engine components calling for sophisticated 
production-related capabilities (ibid.).  
Third, HVN’s made use of what this study refers to as ‘institutionalised competition’ 
among a pool of carefully selected suppliers.47 This form of competition is 
distinguished from market competition in arm’s-length organisation in that (1) the 
scope of competition is limited to those suppliers that pass a careful selection process, 
the lead firm essentially maintaining long-term relations with each of them; and (2) 
selection of suppliers is not based principally on price but rather on comprehensive 
ratings of QCD performance, the assessment of VA and VE proposals submitted by 
suppliers, and the lead firm’s policy on the allocation of business shares48 (Sako 1992; 
Asanuma 1989).  
In practice, the implications of institutionalised competition varied according to type of 
supplier. Those of non-core components (Group 3) faced increasingly intense 
competition, and since alternative sources could be found for them, HVN retained the 
capacity to actually switch suppliers. Moreover, even after a contract was awarded, 
HVN sought to maintain supplier diligence by adjusting its order volume dependent on 
QCD performance (interview #5). Supplier V2 remarked that the company had to think 
carefully in submitting quotations to HVN as it had approximately ten competitors all 
bidding to supply the lead firm (interview #2). Among suppliers of plastic components, 
                                                   
46 VA and VE refer to activities designed to obtain the best value of a component by analysing its 
function and cost. In Japanese manufacturing industries, these techniques have been widely applied 
by lead firms and suppliers as joint problem-solving exercises aimed at mutual gain (Asanuma 
1989; Sako 1992; Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997).   
47 “Institutionalised competition” is a term coined by Sako (1992); Richardson (1993) alludes to 
“parallel sourcing”; while Fujimoto (1999) refers to patterns of supplier competition in the domain 
of product development in the Japanese automobile industry as “development competition”. Similar 
practices are also discussed by Asanuma (1989).   
48 Asanuma (1989) does not discuss what lead firm “policy” specifically means, but HVN’s 
emerging priorities in terms of Honda Group and VEAM suppliers are typical examples.  
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V1 was in receipt of increasing orders for high-precision parts and moulds, while V5 
still focussed on relatively simple components and faced diminishing orders 
(interviews with V1 #2, #4; V5 #2).   
By contrast, the substantive degree of competition faced by suppliers in first two 
groups was apparently weaker. To the extent that HVN opted to expand local sourcing, 
it had to depend on these suppliers as there were no domestic alternatives equipped 
with similar levels of capability to supply core components to the required standards. 
Moreover, with regard to Honda Group suppliers, the fact that the manufacturer had 
long depended on the component design capabilities of parent companies in Japan or 
affiliates in Thailand certainly remained a key consideration in HVN’s sourcing 
decisions. As of 2008–09, Honda Group members and VEAM suppliers continued to 
receive orders from HVN for 100% of the components they specialised in (interviews 
with HVN #4, #5; J2 #2; J3 #2; J6 #2; J10 #1; J11 #1).  
However, there were indications that even these suppliers were beginning to 
experience growing competition. By Stage III, HVN had started to solicit quotations 
even for core components from multiple sources – typically suppliers in China – with 
the aim of applying pressure to the candidates (interview #3). Indeed, all Honda Group 
suppliers interviewed by the author between 2007 and 2009 expressed concern about 
growing competition with overseas suppliers, including subsidiaries of their parent 
companies located in other Southeast Asian countries. For example the general director 
of supplier J3 noted that the company was stepping up its efforts to reduce costs in the 
face of competition not coming only from Thailand and Indonesia but also from China 
in the longer term (interview #2). And the general director of J2 remarked: “So far 
HVN has only asked for quotations from us, but they tell us that they will buy from 
whichever source offers the lowest price; we face intense price-based competition” 
(interview #2).  
In short, the shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to fully adjust its value chain 
to meet changing product requirements. The result was an ‘institutionalised 
competition’ variant of the captive organisational model, which not only combined the 
benefits of long-term, collaborative relations with suppliers and the advantage of 
market forces, but also incorporated adaptations to meet market, industrial and policy 
conditions prevailing in Vietnam. The preferential sourcing approach in respect of the 
VEAM Corporation and the soliciting of quotations from companies located abroad are 
examples of such modifications.  
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5.4 Summary and Discussion 
The in-depth empirical analysis in this section shed light on the dynamic 
transformation of HVN’s value chain over a decade from the late 1990s. In terms of the 
first sub-question, it was argued that the seemingly radical organisational shift 
immediately after the China shock emphasised in the existing literature transpired to be 
short-lived, while a more dynamic and longer-lasting organisational transformation 
occurred in the medium term. By this time, HVN’s value chain had been transformed 
from a ‘foster parent’ variant of the captive model into an ‘institutionalised competition’ 
variant – a hybrid organisational form that systematically combined the conventional 
advantages of long-term relations with suppliers and the benefits of market forces. In 
the end, Honda managed to weather challenges emanating from China by modifying its 
organisational model rather than transforming it into something different.  
With regard to the second sub-question, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the 
nature of the product was not sufficient to explain the trajectory of organisational 
transformation. While HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy, the functioning of 
the market forces it had intended to introduce was constrained by the existing 
alignment of lead firm and supplier capabilities. HVN’s production volume was critical 
in removing this obstacle. By lowering prices, it sought to increase its scale of 
production but this happened only after the Vietnamese government reversed its 
restrictive policy towards foreign motorcycle manufacturers.  
When HVN’s production was finally permitted to expand, it started to exert huge 
purchasing power over its suppliers. As an increasing number of foreign firms were 
attracted to the growing market, supplier capabilities also started to accumulate. An 
important point to note is that even though some suppliers could not be substituted 
domestically, the capabilities they possessed were not indispensable to HVN in the 
sense that there were regional alternatives. This explains why the accumulation of 
supplier capabilities did not result in a shift to a relational chain. Rather, it was the 
combination of HVN’s huge purchasing power and growing supplier capabilities – but 
not complementary competencies – that allowed HVN to exploit institutionalised 
competition to extract constant improvement in manufacturing performance out of its 
suppliers.  
On the whole, the analysis in this section has demonstrated that the Japanese 
organisational model in its original form was not readily adaptable to the emerging 
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Vietnamese market. Although HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy in response 
to the China shock, and actively sought to realign the capability structure in order to 
create conditions conducive to the effective functioning of the market forces it 
intended to introduce, these attempts failed to produce immediate results. This is 
because the government introduced policies that explicitly discriminated against 
foreign motorcycle manufacturers, and supplier capabilities took time to be nurtured or 
realigned. It was eventual incidental policy change as well as medium-term progress in 
accumulation of supplier capabilities that laid the foundations for the dynamic 
transformation of the Japanese model in Stage III, a shift that enabled HVN to 
establish itself as an increasingly dominant actor in the Vietnamese market. 
6. The Emergence and Transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chain in Vietnam  
This section turns the focus to the Chinese organisational model. Rather than being 
transplanted by a major TNC – as had been the case with the Japanese model – the 
Chinese model emerged spontaneously in Vietnam in the early 2000s, as Chinese 
exporters of motorcycle components, Vietnamese assemblers of imported components, 
and component suppliers of different nationalities independently reacted to growing 
business opportunities. Local Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers emerged as lead 
firms that initially assembled imported Chinese components, but gradually expanded 
local sourcing as the government stepped up its enforcement of local content rules. 
In an attempt to examine the dynamic trajectories of organisational transformation, the 
analysis now focuses on the second and third stages of Vietnamese motorcycle 
industrial development: 
 Stage II (2000–2004), when the Chinese model emerged in Vietnam  
 Stage III (2005–2008), when the model was transformed as lead firms and 
suppliers reacted to challenges posed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
6.1 Stage II: The Emergence of Market-based Chains  
The empirical analysis begins by examining the features of the Chinese model as it 
emerged in the early 2000s. Taking account of the dispersed structure of this sector of 
the industry at this stage, the emphasis is on sector-level analysis, which is 
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complemented by analysis of embedded cases of several relatively large assemblers.  
6.1.1 Minimal Coordination Requirements: Low Quality and De facto 
Standardisation 
The types of motorcycles produced by local Vietnamese assemblers were strikingly 
different from the Japanese-brand vehicles that had prevailed in the domestic market, 
the product and process parameters of the former being highly standardised and 
simple.  
First, the high level of standardisation requires elaboration. The existing literature on 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers points out that modularisation allowed 
arm’s-length networks to prevail in this sector (Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen 
Duc Tiep 2006; The Motorbike Working Group 2007). However, the present study 
found otherwise. Rather than transforming motorcycles from integral to modular 
design architecture, Chinese manufacturers used several popular Japanese models as de 
facto standards for duplicative imitation of the external configuration (Ohara 2001; Ge 
and Fujimoto 2004) – the phenomenon that this paper refers to as the de facto 
standardisation of Japanese models. As argued in Fujita (2013a), standardisation of this 
sort is at best partial because full compatibility of components can only be guaranteed 
insofar as they are manufactured in precise accordance with the original Japanese base 
model drawings. This was not the case in China, where uncoordinated duplicative 
imitation gave rise to components that were not strictly compatible.  
The present study found that a similar situation prevailed in Vietnam in the early 2000s. 
In this period, de facto standardisation centred on an even smaller number of Honda’s 
popular models than in China. The author’s interviews of motorcycle retailers in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City in August 2002 found that the overwhelming majority of 
products imitated two of Honda’s most popular models, Dream and Wave, most of 
them featuring C100 or C110 engines with Chinese brands.49 Embedded cases of 
assemblers also confirmed de facto standardisation of a limited number of Japanese 
models. As of the early 2000s, all three assemblers for which detailed data were 
available (A1, A2 and A4) produced imitations of Dream and/or Wave (interviews 
and/or factory visits at A1 #1; A2 #1; A4 #3).  
                                                   
49 The most ubiquitous imitation brands (e.g. ‘Hongda’) and/or popular Chinese brands such as 
Loncin, Lifan and Zongshen were displayed on engine covers (the author’s field visits, and 
interviews with motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in August 2002).  
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As had been the case in China, de facto standardisation of Japanese models in Vietnam 
failed to ensure component compatibility because duplicative imitation took place not 
on the basis of a single, detailed drawing but was invariably the result of uncoordinated, 
repeated duplication of products available on the market, many of which themselves 
carried minor modifications to original designs (Pham Truong Hoang 2007), with 
varying yet generally low levels of precision (interviews and/or factory visits at V15 #1, 
#2; V18 #1; V19 #1).  
The second feature is simple product and/or process parameters. This was confirmed 
by the lack of lead firm requirement beyond price level. The two embedded assemblers 
for which detailed interview data are available (A2 and A4) only specified the names 
of base models or provided samples for replication at best, and neither provided 
detailed drawings or specifications in terms of precision levels, materials, or 
production processes (interviews with A2 #1; A4 #3). These findings are corroborated 
by the author’s interviews with suppliers, as they were not offered the sorts of detailed 
lead-firm specifications discussed in the previous section. Suppliers of engine parts 
explicitly stated that they adopted a single preconfigured design for all their customers 
(interviews with V17 #1; V19 #2; T6 #1), while suppliers of other components were 
typically provided with samples for replication (V15 #2; V23 #1; T7 #2). 
Rather, the focus of assemblers was overwhelmingly on cost. From 2000 to 2001, the 
prices of their products ranged between US$445 and US$565,50 which was roughly a 
quarter of the official price of HVN’s most popular model, the Super Dream 
(U$S1,990) in 2000 (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). It was also much lower than the 
price of the Wave Alpha (US$719), the budget model that HVN launched in 2002. The 
average price of motorcycles produced by the case assemblers in 2004 was US$470 
(Table 9).   
In summary, de facto standardisation and emphasis on price-based competitiveness 
significantly reduced the need for explicit coordination. However, to the extent that de 
facto standardisation failed to ensure full component compatibility, the need for 
coordination could not be eliminated completely. 
 
                                                   
50 ‘The unpredictable fever’ (Saigon Times Weekly dated 17 November 2001); ‘Glut of imported 
motorbikes sparks worries about congestion, accidents’ (Viet Nam News dated 14 December 2001). 
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6.1.2 Dispersed Structure, Limited Capabilities 
To begin with, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain had a fragmented structure consisting of 
a large number of assemblers and a moderately large number of suppliers, both of 
which were small in scale and possessed limited capability. None of these firms held 
sufficient capability to exercise power over others.  
The overall structure of assemblers in the early 2000s can be confirmed on the basis of 
official statistics as well as embedded cases. As of May 2002, 51 Vietnamese 
motorcycle assemblers were in operation.51 Forty-one such firms assembled less than 
40,000 units in 2000, while the largest firm (A2) accounted for just 8.8% of the total 
turnover of all local assemblers. They had limited knowledge of products and/or 
production processes: of the 51 assemblers registered as of 2002, only 7 had initial 
investment in own-production capacity (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 335). 
None of the embedded case assemblers, which were known to be among the largest in 
the early 2000s, had manufacturing experience prior to starting motorcycle production 
(Table 9). Their focus on the assembly of imported or purchased components also 
meant that they did not take on product development, design, manufacturing of key 
components, marketing, or branding.  
Based on official statistics, the total number of suppliers participating in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 2002 is estimated to be about 50.52 However, it is 
suspected that the actual figure was much larger as hundreds of companies entered into 
the production of relatively simple motorcycle components for local assemblers.53 With 
the exception of Taiwanese firms – most of which were specialised providers of 
components already incorporated into Taiwanese and/or Japanese chains (Chen and 
Jou 2002) – suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain possessed limited design 
and/or manufacturing capabilities.  
                                                   
51 Data provided by the Ministry of Industry of Vietnam. While this number is smaller than the 
number of assemblers in China – where Ohara (2006a: 22) notes there were 154 motorcycle 
manufacturers in 2003 – it can still regarded as very large given the much smaller size of the 
Vietnamese market.  
52 The author’s estimate based on a list of firms producing motorcycle components in 2002 
provided by the General Statistics Office, excluding Japanese, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese 
companies that were known to have participated in the Japanese chain.    
53 Nguyen Duc Hien (2004: 238), citing the report by the Economic and Financial Committee of 
the National Assembly in 2001, notes that around 550 firms produced motorcycle components.  
 
 
59 
 
Virtually all Vietnamese suppliers selected as embedded cases were companies 
previously engaged in the small-scale production of replacement components, bicycle 
parts, or household metal and plastic products for the domestic market, and they only 
acquired rudimentary capabilities in Stage II (Table 10).   
Unlike the Japanese chain, assembler–supplier relations in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain were fluid. Table 11 shows several suppliers that received orders from local 
assemblers over short periods of time ranging from a few months to a few years (T1, 
V13, V14, and V19). This table also indicates that the majority of suppliers 
simultaneously traded with a large number of assemblers. Suppliers V16, V17, V20, 
K1, and T6 specifically emphasised that they had no main customer even though they 
traded with some of the largest local assemblers.  
In summary, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain consisted of a large number of assemblers 
and a fairly large number of suppliers, both of which were small in scale and possessed 
limited capabilities. Inter-firm relations were fluid and none of them exercised power 
over others.  
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Table 9. Profiles of Local Assemblers Selected as Embedded Case Studies 
Assembler  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Stages for which detailed data are available  Stages II and III Stage II only Stage III only  Stages II and III Stages II and III Stage III only 
Experience prior to entering into motorcycle assembly 
Trading consumer 
electronics 
Diverse 
(trading, 
tourism, real 
estate, etc.)  
n/a 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Motorcycle 
dealer 
Market share 
2000 
% 8.5% 8.8% 3.8% 1.9% 1.3% (not on the list) 
Ranking 3rd 1st 5th 17th 31st (not on the list) 
2006 
% 23.1% 1.8% 8.3% 1.6% 5.1% 2.8% 
Ranking 1st 17th 4th 19th 7th 9th 
Annual production (units) 
2000 148,000 107,900 72,450 23,731 34,600 (not on the list) 
2007 300,000 (n/a) 95,000 24,000 20,469 30,000 
Average price of motorcycles 
(US$) 
2004 365 451 * (n/a) 439 622 (n/a) 
2007 310 (n/a) 279 373 745 497 
Number of new models 
registered 
2001–04 71 44 41 26 39 8 
2005–07 474 31 219 57 47 33 
Local content ratio (%) 2003 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) 85 80 (n/a) 
Number of suppliers 2007 100 (n/a) 55 60 80 48 
Notes:  
1) n/a = not available 
2) ‘Market share’ denotes the percentage of the market and rank of respective suppliers of all registered Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers included in lists 
provided by the Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office (for 2006).  
3) ‘Number of new models registered’ denotes the number of new models registered with the Vietnam Register for sales in the domestic market.   
4) * The A2 average price is for 2003, while the data for all other assemblers are for 2004. 
Sources: 
1) Turnover: Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (for 2006).  
2) Number of new models registered: The author, based on data from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), accessed 6 January 2009. 
3) All other data obtained from the author’s interviews and questionnaire surveys conducted in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, 
Vietnam Academy of Social Science.   
 
 
61 
 
Table 10. Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V13 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains) 
V14 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains) 
V15 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains) 
V16 Bicycle components Adaptive (Prd) 
V17 Trading  Operational (Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
V18 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
V19 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains) 
V20 Replacement components Operational (Prd/Eq) Operational (Prd/Eq) 
V21 Trading 
 
Operational (Prd/PM) 
V22 Trading Operational (Prd/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
Notes: 
(1) For periods prior to entry into or after exit from the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the unshaded 
area), main lines of business are given. 
(2) For periods after entry into the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the shaded area), the level of new 
product introduction and production-related capabilities acquired by each supplier in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain by the respective stage is shown.  
(3) Types of capability are abbreviated as follows: Prd = new product introduction capability; Eq = 
equipment-related capability; PM = production management capability. 
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers (Fujita 2013b).  
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Table 11. Suppliers’ Dependence on Local Assemblers   
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 
A
1 
A
2 
A
3 
A
4 
A
5 
A
6 
Stage II Stage III 
Suppliers that expanded transactions with Group 1 assemblers in Stage III 
V16 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
53rd X   X     X 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 
2002, accounting for 80-90% of the 
local sales. 
Traded with 20 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for 50% of the total sales. 2006 was the 
peak year. A1, A3, A6 among five largest 
customers.  
V20 1997 Silencers 27th 116th X    X     X 
Traded with a total of 46 companies between 1997 and 2008. As of 2008, had 3 customers, 
accounting for 10% of sales.  
V21 2004 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X      X   X (Not yet established)  
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, 
accounting for 95% of sales. During the peak year, 
had 50 customers. 
C1 2001 
Plastic 
covers, 
frames, 
lights 
not 
included 
6th & 
38th 
X   X X X X (n/a) 
Traded with 43 local assemblers in 2007. A1 
largest. 
C2 2002 Clutches 
not 
included 
24th X         X 
Traded with 24 companies in 2004, 
accounting for 50% of sales. A1 and 
A6 among largest. 
Sales to local assemblers accounting for 56% of 
sales (number of local assemblers unknown). A1 
among largest. 
C3 2002 Frames 
not 
included 
62nd     X       (n/a) 
Traded with 19 local assemblers in 2008. A3 
largest. No products/customers other than 
motorcycle components/local assemblers. 
C4 2003 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
60th       X   X 
Traded with 30 assemblers in 2004. A4 
and A6 among largest.  
Traded with 50 assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to Japanese chains by Stage III 
T1 1999 
Stamped 
components 
not 
included 
9th 
&11th 
(n/a) 
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 1999–2001. No transactions with local assemblers in 2007. 
T2 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
17th (n/a) (n/a) 
Traded with more 10 local assemblers in 2007, 
accounting for 25% of sales.  
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Table 11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 
A
1 
A
2 
A
3 
A
4 
A
5 
A
6 
Stage II Stage III 
T3 1997 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
21st X   X      X (n/a) 
Traded with 16 local assemblers in 2005, 
accounting for 10% of sales. Only A6 placed 
regular orders in 2009. 
T4 2004 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
25th (n/a) 
Expanded sales to local assemblers in 
2002–2003. Accounted for one-third 
of sales in 2004. 
Traded with 4 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for less than 1% of sales.  
T5 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
33rd           X  
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2004. Accounted for less 
than 5% of the total sales. A6 among 
the main customer. 
(n/a) 
K1 1999 Switches 9th 46th     X    X X 
Traded with local assemblers in 2004, 
accounting for 50% of sales. Six 
relatively large customers. 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for 5% of sales. A6 among main 
customers.  
V13 2000 Bearings 
not 
included 
45th X  X         
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2003, accounting for 
20-30% of sales. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
V14 2003 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included 
(no transactions with any of the 
six assemblers) 
Traded with 3 local assemblers only in 
2003, accounting for 10% of sales. 
No transactions with local assemblers. 
V15 2001 
Aluminium 
die-cast 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included 
(no transactions with any of the 
six assemblers) 
(n/a) 
Traded with 5 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for 20% of sales. Maintained long-term 
transactions with 5 customers.  
V17 2001 Clutches 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X      X X   
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2001, accounting for 
100% of sales. A1, A4, and A5 among 
main customers. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to other products/industries by Stage III 
V18 1997 
Steel 
components 
20th 
not 
included 
(n/a) Traded with a total of 36 companies between 1997 and 2006, accounting for 100% of sales. 
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Table 11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 
A
1 
A
2 
A
3 
A
4 
A
5 
A
6 
Stage II Stage III 
V19 1999 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
98th X      X     
Traded with 10 assemblers in 2002, 
accounting for 60% of sales. 
The number of customers reduced to 2-3. Share of 
local assemblers in total sales 5-7% in 2008. 
V22 2000 Chains 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X            
Traded with two local assemblers in 
2000–1, accounting for 50% of sales.  
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, 
accounting for 30% of sales.  
V23 2002 
Wire 
harnesses 
51st 
not 
included 
 
X 
          
Traded with 12 local assemblers in 
2004, accounting for 20% of sales. No 
main customer could be identified. 
2002 was peak year. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers for which developments after Stage III is unknown 
T6 2001 Hubs 6th 
not 
included 
(n/a) 
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2004, accounting for 42% 
of sales. Neither total number of 
customers nor main customers could 
be identified. 
(n/a) 
T7 (n/a) Chains 
not 
included 
66th         X   (n/a) 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 2005, 
accounting for 12% of sales.  
C5 2002 
Plastic 
covers 
not 
included 
133rd (n/a) 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 
2004. 
(n/a) 
Notes:  
1) Nationality of suppliers can be identified by initial letters of supplier codes as follows: C = Chinese; T = Taiwanese; K = Korean; V = Vietnamese. 
2) ‘Ranking by turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in the lists provided by the General 
Statistics Office.  
3) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other industries because their main 
product lines were not motorcycle components.  
4) ‘Transactions with case assemblers’ indicate whether the respective supplier conducted business with the respective assembler at any time.  
Source: The author’s surveys and interviews. 
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6.1.3 Arm’s-Length Linkages in Need of Coordination 
The discussion in Section 6.1.1 showed that although standardised and simple 
parameters prevailed in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain, the requirement for explicit 
coordination was not eliminated entirely. Specifically, the following two types of 
coordination requirement remained:  
 Coordination needs around product parameters remained to the extent that de facto 
standardisation only partially ensured component compatibility.  
 Low quality requirements notwithstanding, even lower levels of supplier 
manufacturing competence resulted in coordination needs around process 
parameters.  
The following examines how assemblers and their suppliers coped with these 
coordination needs via in-depth examination of the three assemblers for which detailed 
data could be obtained: A1, A2 and A4. 
Some assemblers opted for vertical integration. Assemblers A1 and A4 conducted 
in-house manufacturing of components in cooperation with Chinese and Taiwanese 
partners respectively. Although investment in in-house manufacturing was often made 
in response to the government policy (see Section 2.3), the fact that it was a costly 
option for those with small production capacity notwithstanding, these assemblers 
explicitly noted the advantages of the practice. In this regard, assembler A4 noted: 
We want to produce low-price but good-quality motorcycles for [our] customers. 
Therefore, we face many difficulties in sourcing components locally – the quality 
is not stable. So, we need to produce some components even though it is not 
efficient and drives up costs.       
 (A4 #1)  
Asked to compare sourcing components from China, sourcing locally, and 
manufacturing them in-house, a manager of assembler A1 responded:  
Manufacturing components in-house is the best option – in terms of advantages in 
both cost and quality. The key is that we endeavour to increase the quality of our 
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products.         (A1 #1)  
Implicit in the above comment is that this company saw no possibility of implementing 
mechanisms for imposing its quality requirements on external suppliers.  
However, even with these assemblers, in-house manufacturing was typically limited to 
a few types of component only. In the main, lead firms engaged in arm’s-length 
transactions with their suppliers in the sourcing of the majority of components.  
First, two assemblers interviewed by the author (A2 and A4) explicitly noted that they 
adopted a trial-and error approach, switching suppliers whenever they found one to be 
unsatisfactory. This is evident from remarks made by the former procurement manager 
of assembler A2, the largest assembler in 2000: 
Back in the early years [2000–2001], the number of suppliers was limited and thus 
it was difficult to switch suppliers. However, we still tried different suppliers in 
search of those that were stable – in terms of quality, payment, prices and delivery. 
          (A2 #1)  
Second, a lack of explicit governance is also evident from the ordering procedure.54 
Given the very small scale of production, local assemblers placed orders on an ad hoc 
basis.55 Transactions typically began with the assembler providing the supplier with 
either a sample for replication or very simple component specifications (e.g. type of 
component, type of base model, and/or colour). The supplier then provided the lead 
firm with a sample together with a price quotation. If the lead firm accepted both the 
sample and the price, the two parties signed a ‘basic contract’, which normally lasted 
for a year but did not bind the assembler in terms of either volume or frequency of 
orders.  
Clearly, arm’s-length transactions of the sort discussed above failed to provide 
solutions to coordination needs around product and process parameters. However, 
although the problem of low quality could simply be left unresolved, the lack of 
component compatibility posed a serious problem because assemblers were often faced 
                                                   
54 Unless otherwise noted, the description of ordering procedure in this paragraph is based on 
interviews with assemblers A2 #1; A4 #4 and suppliers V13 #1; V15 #2; V17 #1; V19 #2; V23 #1; 
T6 #1; T7 #1. 
55 Even in assembler A2, which recorded the largest turnover in 2000, the average size of each 
order was only 100–200 units (interview #1). 
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with components that could not be assembled. These instances were typically dealt 
with by ad hoc, ex post adjustments by suppliers with the sole intention of making the 
components assemblable. Suppliers were often asked by customers to modify 
components once delivered as they were incompatible with adjacent parts (interviews 
with V13 #1; V15 #2; K1 #2). Nevertheless, such piecemeal modifications fell short of 
full component compatibility, leading to products that were inferior in quality and 
performance to original models.  
In short, limited lead firm and supplier capabilities resulted in a situation in which 
coordination issues arising from the shortcomings of de facto standardisation were left 
unattended. Market-based transactions characterised by ad hoc coordination achieved 
low prices but at the expense of low quality.  
6.2 Stage III: Emergence of Coordination from Below 
This section analyses the responses of local assemblers to fresh challenges in a new 
stage of industrial development: the rapid growth of foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
combined with increasing sophistication of market demand. Since the sector began to 
take a concentrated structure, the analysis starts by briefly discussing the overall 
structure of the industry and then proceeds to detailed analyses of a limited number of 
the largest assemblers and their key suppliers.  
6.2.1 Meeting the Japanese Challenge: Two Contrasting Approaches  
As the new stage of industrial development commenced, local assemblers were faced 
with fresh challenges. First, HVN’s penetration of the middle-income market now 
posed a real threat as it actively invested in production capacity expansion after 2005 
(Section 5.3.2). Second, the upward shift in consumers’ preferences discussed in 
Section 5.3.1 put pressure on local assemblers to increase the quality of their products. 
Having experienced serious quality issues with Chinese motorcycles, Vietnamese 
consumers were no longer willing to accept low prices at the expense of poor quality. 
Local assemblers responded to the new challenges with two distinct approaches.56 One 
group of assemblers focussed on producing a larger variety of models carrying imitated 
                                                   
56 This finding was initially derived from the author’s in-depth analysis of a small number of 
assemblers (Fujita 2006) but it was corroborated by interviews with suppliers operating in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain, particularly C1 #2, #3; K1 #3; T3 #2; V16 #2; and V21 #1. 
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designs at low costs, targeting the low-income rural market that the Japanese 
manufacturers had not penetrated. Another group of assemblers prioritised the 
improvement of product quality, developing own product designs and/or brand names, 
even if this should be at the expense of higher prices.  
The two contrasting approaches can be observed in the embedded cases of the five 
assemblers for which detailed data are available for Stage III (Table 9). Assemblers A1 
and A3 belong to the former category. They are similar in that they kept product and 
process parameters simple and standardised, specifying few requirements beyond price 
level. A number of suppliers explicitly noted that assemblers in this category – A1 in 
particular – specified limited quality requirement (C1 #2, #3; V16 #2; V21 #1). The 
low prices of their products are also an indication that their target was low-income 
consumers. As Table 9 shows, the average price of these assemblers’ products in 2007 
was less than half that of the Wave Alpha, US$801.  
These assemblers continued to capitalise on Japanese designs as de facto benchmarks. 
However, unlike the case in Stage II, these assemblers started to make minor (largely 
cosmetic) modifications to several key components. Alterations to plastic covers and 
frames, which affected the external appearance of the motorcycle, were of particular 
importance (interviews with assembler A4 #4; supplier C1 #2, #3).  
The above approach to the modification of de facto standard models enabled these 
assemblers to achieve a remarkable expansion of product variety, as well as speed and 
flexibility in launching new models. This is most clearly observed in assemblers A1 
and A3. Table 8 shows that the number of new models registered by these assemblers 
increased rapidly after 2005. By this stage, assemblers exploited not only Honda’s two 
most popular motorcycles but also a much larger range of Japanese models – including 
new ones launched after 2005 – as de facto standards for duplicative imitation 
(interviews with supplier C1 #2, #3). Moreover, they launched a large number of new 
products by mixing and matching components with minor modifications (interviews 
with suppliers C1 #3; K1 #2, #3). Supplier K1, which simultaneously traded with HVN 
and local assemblers, described the strength of this group of assemblers as the 
flexibility and speed with which they were able to adjust product strategy: 
[They] are sensitive to market information. They try to obtain information on 
Honda’s future models using their connections with the Ministry of Industry, and 
replicate these products in advance. To cope with the regulations on intellectual 
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property, they combine different types of components. Honda cannot change its 
product strategy quickly, but [local assemblers] can change [product strategy] 
within a week.       (K1 #2) 
Assemblers A5 and A6 belonged to the latter category of assemblers. Unlike those in 
the other group, notable changes were observed in their products. The complexity of 
product and process parameters increased as these assemblers attached priority to 
quality. Suppliers to these assemblers noted that – although by no means on the scale 
exacted by Japanese manufacturers – they were more demanding in terms of quality, 
for which they were willing sacrifice economy of price (interviews with C1 #2; T3 #2; 
V21 #1). Accordingly, the average prices of their products were higher than those of 
the assemblers in the former category (Table 9). Product parameters also grew less 
standardised as these assemblers sought to develop their own designs and brands.57 
Assembler A6 in particular had adopted customised designs for some of its models by 
2007, for the manufacture of which suppliers were provided with design drawings 
together with samples (interviews with assembler A6 #1 and A6’s supplier, T3 #2).  
Assembler A4 fell between the two categories, in that it did not opt to develop 
own-product designs or brands and kept product parameters standardised. However, 
the company did seek to increase the quality of its products, resulting in higher prices 
than those of assemblers A1 and A3 (interview with A4 #4).  
In short, two discrete groups of local assemblers emerged in Stage III, each of which 
adopted a different product strategy. Yet, the question remains as to which of the two 
came to represent the dominant actor within the industry. This puzzle is addressed in 
the next subsection. 
6.2.2 Consolidation of Assemblers and Rise of Supplier Capabilities 
In Stage III, the local assembly sector of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry was 
substantially restructured, assemblers being consolidated into a small number of large 
companies. By 2006, the number of active local assemblers had been reduced to 28, 
roughly half that of 2000.58 Accordingly, the market grew more compact, and it was 
                                                   
57 Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007: 39) also notes A5 and A6 are among those 
assemblers that invest in own-product designs and brands.  
58 Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics 
Office.  
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those assemblers that concentrated on price-based competiveness (the first group 
discussed above) that captured the bulk of the sales share. As Table 9 shows, the largest 
assembler (A1) accounted for 23% of the total turnover of local assemblers in 2006, 
and the four largest firms (inclusive of assemblers A1 and A3) together enjoyed a 50% 
share.59 In contrast, assemblers that focussed on non-price-based competitiveness (the 
second group discussed above) accounted for a much smaller market share.  
However, there was little indication that either group of assemblers had amassed new 
capabilities. Those in the second category developed their own products by mobilising 
external capabilities rather than building their own internal capabilities: A5 
collaborated with Chinese partners (questionnaire survey in 2007), while A6 
outsourced product design to overseas companies (interview #1). 
Consolidation progressed on the suppliers’ side as well. As local content rules were 
relaxed in 2003, local assemblers as a whole began to depend increasingly on imported 
components (Table 12), relying on local sourcing only when parts were available at 
competitive prices. Table 11 classifies suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain 
according to their positions in Stage III. Of those interviewed by the author, several 
quickly expanded sales to local assemblers, the largest firms in particular such as A1 
and A3 (V16, C1, C2, C3, and C4). At the same time, the remaining suppliers faced 
diminishing sales to local assemblers, and they either shifted to the Japanese chain or 
other industries.  
Table 12. Value of Imported Components per Vehicle Sold (Unit: US$) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
HVN 692 641 275 231 203 218 
Local Assemblers 506 338 181 179 420 396 
Source: The author, based on data provided in Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007).  
What is striking is the size of turnover and the number of customers the first group of 
suppliers served at this stage. Supplier C1 had two factories registered as independent 
companies, which in 2006 ranked as 6th and 38th respectively in terms of turnover of 
all operational motorcycle component manufacturers in Vietnam, including the largest 
Japanese suppliers that served 100% of HVN’s growing orders. In 2007, this supplier 
sold over 860,000 units of plastic covers and frames (interview with C1 #1), which 
                                                   
59 Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics 
Office.  
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more or less accounts for the total number of motorcycles produced by local 
assemblers in that year (Figure 1). Moreover, these suppliers simultaneously served 20 
to 50 local assemblers in Stage III (Table 11), which was in fact more than the 
aforementioned number of officially registered local assemblers in 2006.60  
Suppliers expanding their sales to local assemblers are particularly notable for the 
extent to which they built design and manufacturing capabilities. Moreover, unlike 
suppliers under the Japanese model, the accretion of new capabilities in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain was achieved primarily through suppliers’ independent 
volition rather than as the result of explicit demand from or assistance of lead firms. As 
the most prominent example, C1 had invested in generic manufacturing competencies 
in order to achieve reasonable quality, prompt delivery, and low prices, whilst 
mobilising the capability of the company’s R&D centre in China to reverse-engineer 
existing component designs and conduct minor cosmetic modifications (interview #1). 
The ability to conduct large-scale manufacturing to reasonable quality standards was 
developed by importing equipment and machinery from China and mobilising Chinese 
engineers (ibid.). The huge production volume also enabled the company to exploit 
economies of scale.  
Likewise, V16, a Vietnamese supplier of silencers, was one of the few local suppliers 
continuing to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in Stage III. This firm was the 
only local supplier subjected to in-depth analysis by this study that had acquired an 
adaptive or basic innovative level of new product introduction capability (Table 10). 
Whereas it had replicated existing products in the 1990s, it subsequently gradually 
started to make cosmetic and functional modifications to standardised designs 
(interviews #1, #2). This was achieved through its own R&D efforts and attempts to 
engage with assemblers. The supplier independently established an R&D department, 
investing in design equipment, software, and testing and measuring equipment, as well 
as training its own design engineers (interview #1).  
In short, the local motorcycle assembly sector was consolidated into those assemblers 
that focussed on price-based competitiveness in standardised models with minor 
external modifications. Consolidation also progressed on the suppliers’ side, which 
resulted in the rise of those with manufacturing and design competencies.  
                                                   
60 This is likely to be because some assemblers had shifted their focus to other lines of business 
where they were officially registered, yet continued to produce motorcycles on a small scale.  
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6.2.3 The Rise of Supplier-Driven Coordination 
The result of the rapid consolidation of lead firms and suppliers amounted to de facto 
mutual dependence between large assemblers and large, competent suppliers. The 
results of questionnaire surveys conducted in 2007 show that assemblers A1, A3, A4, 
A5 and A6 developed relatively long-term relations with a limited number of key 
suppliers that extended for between three and six years, suggesting that the relations 
between lead firms and suppliers had stabilised.  
However, this does not imply Japanese-type organisation in which lead firms and 
suppliers are locked into particular relations. Assemblers expressed strong preference 
to avoid dependence on specific suppliers. Table 13 shows that all of five assemblers 
under study cited the optimum number of suppliers for each type of component as two 
to three in order that they should not be dependent on specific firms. Remarkably, no 
major differences were observed between the two groups of assemblers. Neither were 
suppliers locked into relations with specific customers, a finding that is clearly 
illustrated by the large number served by suppliers surviving to Stage III (Table 11).  
Table 13. Assemblers’ Preferred Number of Suppliers of Each Component 
 
Number of suppliers* Reason 
A1 2–3 Competition based on quality and price is beneficial 
A3 2–3 Allows the assembler to take the initiative. 
A4 2–3 Allows suppliers to compete based on quality and price. 
A5 2–3 Allows the selection of suppliers based on price, quality and delivery. 
A6 2–3 Avoids passivity and defensiveness. 
Note: * Assemblers were asked to choose between one, two to three, or more than three. 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey conducted in 2007 in collaboration with the Vietnam 
Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science.  
Thus far, it has become clear that the local motorcycle assembly sector came to be 
dominated by a small number of large assemblers producing low-priced, standardised 
models with minor external modifications. While their success is plausible given that 
they catered to the extreme low-end section of the Vietnamese market that even HVN’s 
budget model had not penetrated, the question remains as to how they managed to 
resolve coordination issues around product and process parameters. First, the limits of 
de facto standardisation – as discussed at length in Section 6.1 – remained in place. 
These assemblers should have been able to achieve at least reasonable quality levels 
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since their target consumers were no longer willing to accept low quality just because 
the products were cheap. Second, the assemblers were able to make minor 
modifications to original Japanese component designs, a factor that compounded 
coordination requirements. The question is therefore one of how firms met the 
necessary level of coordination. 
This question was explored via in-depth analyses of the embedded cases assemblers A1 
and A3, and their largest suppliers. The findings suggest that it was the suppliers rather 
than the assemblers that took the lead in dealing with coordination issues. By dealing 
systematically with non-compatibility problems arising from de facto standardisation 
and making modifications to component designs on behalf of their customers, these 
suppliers became the key force driving the transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain.  
Such supplier-driven changes are demonstrated by the in-depth analysis of suppliers 
C1 and V16 discussed above. C1 rapidly expanded sales to local assemblers by 
utilising design competencies and generic large-scale manufacturing capacity to 
provide the complete, fine-tuned component modules that were most critical to the 
assemblers; incorporating minor cosmetic modifications, and processing them to 
reasonable quality, prompt delivery, and low cost standards. Although the supplier 
produced a large variety of motorcycle components, it focussed most sharply on plastic 
covers, frames and lights (interview #2). This is because local assemblers attached the 
highest importance to these component modules in terms of product differentiation, 
meaning that their manufacture called for exacting design work given that they 
essentially determined the external appearance of the whole vehicle.61 Each year, C1 
launched an average of four designs incorporating minor modifications to these most 
necessary modules (interview #1). The three types of component that comprised the 
modules were fine-tuned with each other in order to maximise the performance of the 
module as a whole. Moreover, unlike the ad hoc, ex post adjustments typically 
observed in Stage II, supplier C1 systematically adjusted the interfaces of these 
modules with adjacent components at the initial stages of contact with assemblers 
(interview #2).  
V16 provides another case in point. Its main products, silencers, were critical to local 
assemblers because they affected both the product’s performance and its external 
                                                   
61 Interviews with supplier C1 #3 and assembler A4 #4. Ge and Fujimoto (2005: 98–9) note that 
this was also the case in China.   
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appearance. This supplier continued to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 
Stage III as it made effective use of its design and manufacturing capabilities to 
conduct minor cosmetic and/or functional modifications to the existing designs of this 
important component on behalf of its customers, because “local assemblers did not 
have design drawings and did not know anything about technical parameters” 
(interview #1). Based on surveys of local assemblers, motorcycle dealers, and final 
consumers, V16 regularly launched new designs which reflected the latest market 
trends and policy requirements and carried the company’s own brand name (interviews 
#1, #2).  
In contrast, there was little indication that the sourcing practices of assemblers A1 and 
A3 were substantially different from those that had prevailed in Stage II, which 
suggested that the impetus for organisational innovation did not come from lead firms. 
Apart from the fact that their relations with key component suppliers had stabilised and 
been sustained over the long term, there was no evidence that the procedure for placing 
orders had changed in comparison to the previous stage as described in Section 6.1. 
Suppliers that continued to trade with either assembler A1 or A3 in Stage III, namely, 
C1, V16 and V21, noted that the manner in which these assemblers specified and 
monitored component quality and precision levels remained unchanged (interviews 
with C1 #2; V16 #2; V21 #1). None of these suppliers were provided active monitoring 
by assemblers A1 or A3, as noted by supplier C1: 
As for assemblers like A1 and A3, because the size of their orders is very large, 
they do not check the quality of the components carefully. Their complaints mostly 
concern wrong colours.       (C1 #2) 
The result of these supplier-driven changes was ‘coordination from below’, which 
addressed those coordination issues arising from the limitations of de facto 
standardisation without assemblers or suppliers being locked into particular relations or 
having to engage in intense communication. With the ability to conduct reverse 
engineering, design modification, and large-scale manufacturing, the two suppliers 
discussed in detail above together with several others formed a “shared supply base” 
(Sturgeon and Lee 2005) for local assemblers as a whole, including major assemblers 
such as A1 and A3 as well as other firms operating on a smaller scale.  
Although the above features of this emerging industrial organisation apparently 
resembled a modular chain (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005), the coordination 
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pattern emerging in Stage III of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry should be 
distinguished from such a chain because: (1) de facto standardisation was partial in that 
it did not do away with coordination requirements; and (2) standardisation did not 
extend to the whole vehicle. Because of this partiality, suppliers C1 and V16 still had 
to adjust component interfaces for each of their customers, although they managed to 
reduce the time and cost of modifications by implementing them systematically.  
Nevertheless, albeit partial, supplier-driven coordination was the form of 
organisational adaptation best suited to the market conditions and capability alignment 
prevailing in Vietnam at the time. For suppliers, exploiting de facto standardisation to 
serve numerous customers made economic sense because in Vietnam’s fragmented 
market, pooling orders from multiple assemblers was the only way to achieve 
sufficient economies of scale (Fujita 2011). For assemblers who lacked both design 
and manufacturing competencies, relying on competent suppliers was the easiest and 
fastest route to solving the immediate problems of non-compatibility; increasing 
product variety by achieving cosmetic modifications to several key components; and 
exploiting the cost advantage of large-scale production.  
6.3 Summary and Discussion 
This section analysed the emergence and transformation of the Chinese model in 
Vietnam. In respect of the first sub-question concerning the trajectory of organisational 
transformation, the findings presented in this section did not render support to the 
argument of the empirical research to date, which has focussed on a small number of 
assemblers operational up to Stage II to argue that they started to develop long-term, 
trust-based relations with their suppliers.  
Conversely, the foregoing analysis showed that in Stage III several powerful suppliers 
took the lead in addressing coordination needs on behalf of their customers without 
lead firms or suppliers having to engage in intense communication or being locked into 
particular relations. This suggests that even assuming a lead firm-driven shift towards 
trust-based relations had obtained among a certain group of assemblers in Stage II, it 
was still likely to be a transitory. The limited knowledge of products and production 
processes possessed by local assemblers also suggests that such networks even if they 
had existed were unlikely to have been sustainable. The research design adopted in this 
paper was critical in showing the overriding trend of organisational transformation in 
this sector of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry; that is, empirical research based on 
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the integration of industry-level and firm-level data facilitated the analysis of changes 
in the operations of both lead firms and suppliers over an extended period of time.  
With regard to the second sub-question concerning the determinants of organisational 
transformation, it was argued that the product characteristics emphasised in the 
existing literature are in themselves insufficient to explain the phenomenon. De facto 
standardisation of Japanese models and low quality requirements reveal why 
arm’s-length linkages prevailed in the early 2000s but do not account for the 
emergence of supplier-driven coordination in Stage III.  
The empirical findings showed that the driver for change came primarily from the rise 
of supplier competencies. This was in sharp contrast to the Japanese chain, in which 
the lead firm actively sought to realign the capability structure to create conditions 
conducive to the effective functioning of its organisational adjustment. By 
independently accumulating complementary competencies in conducting minor design 
modifications to existing models and manufacturing them in large quantities to 
reasonable standards, a small number of suppliers – including those analysed in depth 
as embedded case studies – formed a shared supply base for large and small assemblers 
seeking to increase the product variety of low-priced, standardised models aimed at the 
low-income market still unexploited by HVN.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper began by highlighting the challenges that the newly emerging Chinese 
model of industrial organisation posed to the conventional Japanese model. What can 
we learn from the rivalry between these two models in a third country context? How 
does its analysis contribute to the literature on models and trajectories of industrial 
organisation? By integrating extensive primary and secondary data collected at 
different points in time, this paper sought to describe and explain the decade-long 
organisational transformation in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry resulting from the 
direct clash of two contrasting models of industrial organisation. This concluding 
section summarises the empirical findings corresponding to the two sub-questions, and 
discusses the contribution of this paper to the wider body of literature on industrial 
organisation.  
First, this paper asked a ‘how’ question on the dynamic evolution of industrial 
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organisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry: How did the Japanese and 
Chinese organisational models evolve in Vietnam? The literature suggests that these 
two models converged; however, the present study found that such convergence was 
short-lived. What seemed like important changes in both Japanese and Chinese models 
in the early 2000s were eventually abandoned, while more dynamic, long-lasting 
changes got underway at a later stage of industrial development. In the end, the 
Japanese model shifted from one variant to another variant of the same captive model 
of industrial organisation. The Chinese model essentially remained one of loosely 
coordinated organisation throughout the period of analysis; although it came to be 
characterised by several competent suppliers playing partial yet critical coordinating 
roles in later years. Fundamental differences between the two models continued to 
persist in the medium term.  
Second, this study examined the reasons for these organisational changes; that is, what 
factors drove the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry? The literature emphasises the nature of the product that respective lead firms 
manufactured. Yet, the longitudinal analysis in the present paper found that explaining 
short- and medium-term trajectories of organisational transformation required another 
variable – that of the changing capability alignment in the respective value chains.  
The transformation of the Japanese model into an institutionalised competition variant 
can be explained in terms of changing capability alignment in both the lead firm and its 
suppliers, that is, lead firm acquisition of purchasing power and increasing supplier 
capabilities but not complementary competencies. It was HVN that took the lead in 
nurturing the necessary capabilities – not only its own but also those of its suppliers – 
although it took time and the dismantling of policy constraints before such initiatives 
started to produce the desired results. Conversely, the transformation of the Chinese 
model can be explained primarily in terms of the formation of supplier capabilities, 
that is, the rise of specialist suppliers with design modification and large-scale 
manufacturing competencies.  
In addition to empirical findings specific to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, this 
paper also makes an important contribution to the broader body of literature. First, by 
systematically tracing the long-term transformation of two industrial organisational 
models, this paper shed new light on the processes through which organisations evolve 
over time. The empirical findings showed that organisational transformation was far 
from a smooth and automatic process. In practice, such processes involved challenges, 
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struggles and tensions. The results were diverse hybrids or intermediate forms of 
industrial organisation that did not necessarily correspond to the five most typical 
governance forms. The empirical findings indicate that the captive model – the 
conventional form of Japanese industrial organisation – can in practice be implemented 
as two distinct variants, each with strikingly different implications for competitiveness 
and supplier development. ‘Coordination from below’ in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain is another example of a hybrid form of organisation. Albeit partial, this provided 
effective means for local assemblers and suppliers to meet Japanese challenges under 
the conditions prevailing in Vietnam.  
Second, this study systematically explained the trajectories of organisational change in 
terms of two elaborate and operational variables: the nature of product/process 
parameters and the alignment of relevant capabilities. While much of the previous 
theoretical and empirical research has focussed on chain governance in its most 
orthodox forms, these patterns emerge only where specific combinations of these two 
variables are present. Where models are transferred to different contexts or where they 
meet new competitive challenges, there may be many instances in which ideal sets of 
conditions for intended organisational adaptation are unavailable. It is indeed such 
misalignments of variables that created the aforementioned challenges, struggles and 
tensions.  
Indeed, contrary to Gibbon et al.’s (2008) contention, the two variables did not 
transpire to be structural constraints to transactions. These variables were heavily 
influenced by the strategic actions of firms in the value chain, and it was in fact such 
actions of lead firms and/or suppliers aimed at realigning these variables – albeit with 
limitations – that drove industrial organisation to full or partial transformation. HVN 
made active attempts to realign the capability structure in order to create the necessary 
conditions for the effective functioning of the market forces it sought to introduce. In 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, coordination needs arising from the partial nature of de 
facto standardisation were simply left unattended in the early years because none of the 
actors had the capacity to deal with them. These needs were eventually met by the rise 
of competent suppliers that had both the will and the capacity to play a partial yet 
critical role in implementing the requisite coordination.  
Finally, the empirical findings of this study also provide important insights into the 
emerging rivalry between the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation. 
In terms of its capacity to exploit the potential (unrealised) market demand and to 
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capitalise on the existing alignment of relevant capabilities, the Vietnamese case 
demonstrates that the Chinese model initially proved more adaptable to developing 
country conditions. However, in the medium term, the Japanese model gained 
supremacy over the Chinese model as Japanese lead firms made certain – but not 
fundamental – adjustments to the nature of their products, while actively realigning the 
capability structure. Conversely, while the Chinese model lost supremacy in the 
medium term, it nevertheless continued to function in an adapted form as suppliers 
gained the complementary competencies required by local assemblers. The result of 
repeated rounds of organisational adaptation was enhanced organisational diversity. 
After a decade, the two models continued to exist side by side, both retaining the 
essential features of the original models yet incorporating important adjustment. 
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 APPENDIX LIST OF FIRMS, INTERVIEWS, AND SURVEYS 
 
1. Interviews in Thailand  
Firms Code Interview details 
Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1 President on 11 January 2010. 
 
2. Interviews in Vietnam 
(1) Honda Vietnam (HVN)  
Code Interview details 
#1 General Director at the factory on 31 July 2001. 
#2 
Director of Production and Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 21 
September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 20 November 2007. 
#4 Director and Senior Manager of Purchasing Department on 19 September 2008. 
#5 Director, Senior Manager, and Manager of Purchasing Department on 7 March 2009. 
 
(2) Vietnamese assemblers  
Firms 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
A1 
#1 
Head of Administrative Department on 22 September 2004 
(includes factory visit). 2004/ 2007 
  
#2 
Head of Administrative Department on 1 August 2005 (includes 
factory visit). 
A2 
#1 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at a café in Tokyo on 
24 February 2009. 
– 
#2 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at the Institute of 
Developing Economies, Chiba on 27 February 2009. 
A3 #1 
Officer of Administrative Department on 23 November 2007 
(includes factory visit). 
2007 
A4 
#1 Vice General Director on 23 September 2004. 
2004/ 2007 
  
  
  
  
#2 Vice General Director on 2 August 2005. 
#3 
Vice General Director and Factory Manager on 4 August 2005 
(includes factor visit). 
#4 General Director and Deputy Director on 22 November 2007. 
#5 General Director on 4 March 2009. 
A5 – (Requests for interviews were rejected in 2004 and 2007.) 2004/ 2007 
A6 #1 
General Director and Deputy General Director on 26 November 
2007 (includes factory visit). 
2007 
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(3) Vietnamese suppliers  
Firm Code Interview details 
V1  
#1 Director of Planning Department on 17 October 2003. 
#2 Deputy Director on 3 September 2008. 
#3 
Chairman; General Director; and Manager of Planning Department on 24 
November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#4 
Chairman; General Director; Deputy General Director; Factory Manager; and 
five other managers on 3 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V2  
#1 
President/General Director and Deputy manager of Personnel Department on 5 
September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
Director of Technical Department at the factory on 19 November 2008 (includes 
factory visit). 
V3  
#1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Deputy Manager of Technical Department on 20 November 2008. 
V4  
#1 Vice General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Vice General Director on 3 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V5  
#1 General Director on 16 October 2003 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director and Director of Technology Department on 9 March 2009 
(includes factory visit). 
V6 #1 General Director on 17 November 2009. 
V7 
#1 
Director of Production and Director of Finance on 25 September 2004 (includes 
factory visit). 
#2: General Director on 11 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Two Vice General Directors on 11 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
#4 General Director at VEAM’s office in Hanoi 13 January 2010. 
V8  
#1 General Director at the company's factory on 20 November 2008. 
#2 
General Director at the company's factory on 5 March 2009 (includes factory 
visit). 
V9 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
Manager of Engineering Department on 21 November 2008 (includes factory 
visit). 
#3 General Director at the VEAM’s office in Hanoi on 13 January 2010. 
V10  
#1 Managing Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 President on 15 November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V11 #1 General Director and Director on 9 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V12 #1 
Manager of Finance and Deputy Manager of Sales on 12 March 2009 (includes 
factory visit). 
V13 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
Managers of Technical Department, Equipment Department, Manager of Quality 
Control Department, and Technical Department No.2 on 21 November 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V14 #1 
Director and Manager of Technology Department at the company's factory in Ho 
Chi Minh City on 13 March 2009 (include factory visit). 
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V15 
  
#1 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 3 August 2005 (includes 
factory visit). 
#2 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 5 September 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V16 
#1 General Director on 24 November 2008. 
#2 General Director on 5 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V17 
  
#1 
General Director and Director of Sales Department on 12 September 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director and Manager of Accounting Department on 22 November 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V18 #1 Director on 4 September 2008 (include factory visit). 
V19  
#1 General Director on 2 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 8 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V20 
#1 General Director on 15 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V21 #1 General Director on 4 March 2009.  
V22 #1 
Managing Director and Factory Director on 14 March 2009 (includes factory 
visit). 
V23 #1 Deputy Director on 25 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
 
(4) Japanese suppliers  
Firms Code Interview details 
J1 #1 General Director on 1 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
J2 
#1 General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J3 
#1 General Director on 20 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 19 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 18 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J4 #1 General Director on 22 May 2003. 
J5 #1 
General Director and Factory Manager on 11 November 2003 (includes factory 
visit). 
J6 
#1 General Director on 20 November 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director, Director and Manager of Purchasing Department on 20 
November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J7 #1 General Director on 4 September 2002. 
J8 #1 General Director on 27 July 2001 (includes factory visit). 
J9 #1 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J10 #1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J11  #1 General Director on 15 January 2010 (includes factory visit). 
 
(5) Chinese suppliers  
Firm 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
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C1 
#1 General Director on 23 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
– #2 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 2 March 2009. 
#3 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 11 March 2009. 
C2 – – 2004/2007 
C3 – – 2004/2007 
C4 – – 2004/2007 
C5 – – 2004 
 
(6) Taiwanese suppliers  
Firm Code Interview details 
T1 
#1 Japanese Technical Advisor on 26 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Deputy General Director on 28 November 2007. 
T2 #1 Sales and Import Assistant Manager on 27 November 2007. 
T3 
#1 General Director on 3 August 2005. 
#2 General Director on 6 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
T4 #1 Deputy General Director and Manager of Sales Department on 27 November 2007. 
T5 #1 Deputy General Director on 29 July 2005. 
T6 #1 Director of Finance Department on 10 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
T7 #1 Deputy General Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
 
(7) Korean supplier  
Firm Code Interview codes and details 
K1 
#1 Chief of Financial Department on 10 September 2004. 
#2 General Director on 29 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 13 March 2009. 
 
(8) Industry experts 
Organisations Code Interview details 
Vietnam Association of Bicycles 
and Motorcycles (Vinacycle) 
#1 Specialist on 23 September 2004. 
#2 
Chairman and Chief of Administrative Office on 21 
November 2007. 
#3 Chief of Administrative Office on 15 January 2010. 
 
(9) Motorcycle retailers  
Organisations Interviews  
Hanoi 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 27 August 
2002. 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 13 January 
2010. 
Long An Province Several motorcycle retailers in Tan An, Long An on 25 July 2005. 
Ho Chi Minh City Several motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City on 11-12 September 2004. 
